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In the United Kingdom, a central issue of contemporary 
foreign policy is whether or not to enter into full 
membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU).  
Membership has profound implications for the development of 
the European Union (EU) and the future of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and potentially upon 
the much heralded Anglo-American ‘special relationship’.  
On a practical level, excluding the political implications 
of membership, joining the EMU means surrendering the pound 
sterling for the euro and in doing so the British would 
also surrender control of monetary policy.  This thesis 
will examine the historical links between British defence 
and monetary policy and argues that there are strong 
historical bonds that link the two in the political 
psychology of Britain.  This link has created for Britain 
twin nationalistic icons in the pound and the military.  
This thesis illustrates that a paradox exists in that 
membership in the EMU would improve British defence 
spending and yet nationalistic forces resist membership.  
At the same time, forces in Britain in favor of monetary 
integration, unable to accomplish it but pressured to show 
they are dedicated to the project of European integration, 
paradoxically commit to further defence integration thought 
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Queen: Good Hamlet, cast thy nighted colour  
off, 
And let thine eyes look like a friend on Denmark. 
Do not for ever with thy vailed lids 
Seek for thy noble father in the dust. 
Thou know’st ‘tis common.  All that lives must  
die, 
Passing through nature to eternity. 
Hamlet: Ay, madam, it is common. 
Queen:                           If it be, 
Why seems it so particular with thee? 
Hamlet: Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not 
‘seems.’1 
 
In his exhaustive history of the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in twentieth century European integration, Hugo 
Young uses two Shakespearean analogies to typify British 
behavior.  The first, from Richard II, is the defiant 
praise of English exceptionalism by virtue of being 
detached and apart from continental Europe.  John of Gaunt 
provides the soliloquy from which Young draws his title, 
“This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.”2  
The second allusion is found in the conclusion of his 
examination of British Euro-skepticism.  Young considers 
that, at times, perhaps Britain has been more akin to the 
elderly King Lear, railing against the storm of European 
integration, but powerless to prevent it.3 
In considering the issue of membership in the European 
Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2004, Hamlet, 
the apogee of the Bard’s works, provides a fitting analogy 
                     1 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act 1, scene 2. 
2 William Shakespeare, Richard the Second, act 2, scene 1. 
3 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to 
Blair (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1998), 505. 
2 
for British Euro-skepticism.4  Europe, the comforting Queen, 
beseeches her distant son Britain to cease his grieving for 
the lost power of the pound sterling and accept that, 
‘…’tis common…’  Indeed not just the loss of power, but the 
euro too, is common to nearly all the powers of Europe, 
save Britain.  The perplexed queen wonders why it seems so 
particular for her awkward child, the United Kingdom, while 
this step has been so easy for the others to embrace.  
Britain would respond, as Hamlet does, that it does not 
seem difficult, it is difficult.  To comprehend why it is 
so ‘particular’ in 2004 for Britain to surrender the pound 
for the euro requires an understanding of a complex web of 
economic and political interests. 
Rational interests represent legitimate concerns for 
the future well being of the nation.  This thesis does not 
refute them, but will illustrate the roots of one of the 
obstacles to EMU; British monetary nationalism.  This 
particular component of British nationalism was born of the 
deep relationship that existed in Britain, particularly 
between 1879 and 1973, between defence5 and currency.  
Defence embodies the acme of national sovereignty; it is as 
Alan Milward explains, “… [the nation state’s] oldest and 
primary duty…”6 Due to the intimate relationship between 
                     4 Choosing Hamlet for this parallel is clearly thick with irony given 
that in June 1992 the Danes rejected the 1991 Maastricht Treaty in a 
national referendum.  British euro-skeptics drew great inspiration from 
this, as the timing coincided with the British Parliamentary debate on 
the same treaty.  It also occurred at the same time as Britain’s 
withdrawal of from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) due to 
currency speculation.  The Danes would later pass the treaty in a 
second referendum but, Young cites the timing of the first Danish 
rejection as nearly sinking the treaty in Britain and causing Prime 
Minister John Major’s government to fall.  Maastricht only passed the 
Commons 319-313. Young, 392-397. 
5 In this thesis the British spelling of topic specific words like 
defence, programme and armour will be used. 
6 Alan Milward with George Brennan and Federico Romero, The European 
3 
money and defence, currency has assumed a pivotal stature 
in the iconography of British nationalism. 
This thesis will explore the historical relationship 
between British military strength, the international 
strength of British currency and its impact on British 
nationalism.  The mutually supporting nature of the 
relationship, prior to 1973, has embossed the two concepts 
inseparably on opposite sides of the same coin of national 
sovereignty. This leaves Britain today in a quandary 
regarding Economic and Monetary Union.  This thesis will 
also illustrate that ironically, in light of nationalistic 
resistance, the EMU actually offers numerous benefits to 
British defence.  Finally, this thesis will propose that 
modern British nationalism is a source of two paradoxical 
realities in contemporary British politics. 
The first paradox is a result of the Conservative 
Party’s nationalist wing which places defence and monetary 
independence on the same plane.  Consequently, the Tories 
remain unable to seize the issue of monetary union as a 
route to improving national defence.  The second is due to 
the nationalistic sensitivities of the British polity 
regarding the sovereignty of currency.  EMU must be 
approached with the greatest care by the Labour Party which 
has, in the last decade, favored membership in the euro.  
The paradox has emerged from the inability of Labour to 
bring Britain into full EMU membership and subsequently has 
                     
Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992), 4. The political theorist Max Weber in Volume I of Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1968), provides the most basic and most common definition of the 
sovereign state as a political community which exercises legitimate 
domination over the inhabitants of a defined territory.  The modern 
concept of the state has extended responsibility to not only exercise 
coercive force over its occupants but also to organize military defense 
to use force against other states. 
4 
caused it to make commitments and a concession on EU 
defence issues.  The objective of these concessions has 
been to demonstrate its ‘Europeanness’ and maintain a 
position of influence in Europe. 
A. BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The future of the relationship between Britain and the 
burgeoning European Union has been a topic of great debate 
in the United Kingdom for many years.  Since the founding 
of the European Community and through Britain’s subsequent 
membership in the 1970’s, the British have wrestled with 
what it means to be both British and European.7  The subject 
of the most significant debate facing the United Kingdom 
today is membership in the European Monetary Union.  
Joining the EMU would bind Britain even closer to Europe by 
adopting the euro as the official currency of the United 
Kingdom.  This step would be greater than the symbolic move 
of forsaking the long treasured pound sterling for the euro 
note; it would take the monetary policy out of the hands of 
British Citizens and give it to the European Central Bank 
(ECB).8 
Since the end of the Second World War, the process of 
European integration has brought the states of Europe 
closer together both economically and politically.  
European integration is often credited with making war 
between the nation-states of Europe inconceivable if not 
                     7 Young’s entire book deals with the many machinations of Britain’s 
political class on the subject of European integration since the Second 
World War.  His primary method is biographical research and primary 
source interviews.  It provides in depth analysis not just of ruling 
Prime Ministers but of the deeper currents of the opposition party, the 
fragmentation of parties on the issue of ‘Europe’ and those political 
leaders, both in and out of power who have lead Britain both for and 
against Europe. 
8 The ECB is an independent monetary control authority which prints 
euro currency and regulates the flow of money in the Euro area. 
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impossible.  Britain has consistently viewed this process 
with suspicion and skepticism, punctuated only by 
contradictory fits of enthusiasm.9  In some ways this 
dualism is personified by Sir Winston Churchill.  In 1949, 
Churchill, respected throughout Europe as the peerless 
leader of the day, delivered a speech in Zurich in which he 
called for the Continent to immediately embark on a project 
to create a, ‘United States of Europe’.  For this, he is 
remembered a step-founding father of the European Union.  
Despite this championing of unified Europe, Churchill 
clearly envisioned a ‘United States of Europe’ as one that 
did not include the United Kingdom.10  The chronology that 
follows is provided as scenery against which to view 
British behavior concerning defence and monetary policy 
which will be outlined in Chapter II.  It is not an effort 
to explain British actions regarding European unity. 
On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
announced the intent to form the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC).  The ECSC melded the coal and steel 
producing resources of France and Germany into a single 
economic entity subject to shared decisions.  This 
announcement, just five years after Great Britain, Europe’s 
unquestioned leader, had emerged victorious from the Second 
World War came as a total shock to the British.  They had 
not known that France, Germany, and eventually, Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Luxembourg, would take such an 
unprecedented step towards economic unity.  Britain was 
invited to participate in this union, but declined to do 
                     9 Young, 1-3. 
10 Simon Bulmer, “History and Institutions of the European Union” in 
The Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis ed. Mike Artis 
and Norman Lee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8 and Young, 
16-18. 
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so. Their belief, at the time, was that it would fail and 
that surrendering a portion of economic sovereignty was 
unwise.11  Britain would remain an associate, non-
participating member of the ECSC. 
The next step towards European economic integration 
was the 1957 Treaty of Rome which created the European 
Economic Community (EEC).  The EEC established a common 
market thus eliminating tariff barriers between the member 
states and opening the markets of Europe.  Like the ECSC, 
the United Kingdom did not join the EEC comprised of 
France, Germany, Italy and the BENELUX countries that came 
into being in 1958.  Great Britain would resist the EEC 
while forming a competing trade union called the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA).  The EFTA was a vain attempt 
to wreck the entire EEC.12  After twice having its 
application to the EEC rebuffed by French President Charles 
de Gaulle, Britain joined the EEC in 1973. 
Five years later, Britain would face another step in 
economic integration with Europe; the European Monetary 
System (EMS) with its embedded Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM).  As the functional element of the EMS, the ERM 
pegged the currencies of all its members in order to 
maintain price stability throughout the Community.  The EMS 
was founded on the positive experiences of European 
exchange rate stability of the 1960’s.  In that period, 
currencies had nearly fixed exchange rates.  This 
phenomenon was in stark contrast to the start of the 1970’s 
when all European currencies floated against one another 
resulting in exchange instability.13  The ERM established a 
                     11 Milward, 346-347 and Young, 45 and 67. 
12 Bulmer, 8 and Young, 118. 
13 Young, 300-301. 
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central rate for all member currencies based upon the 
German deutschmark (DM) with a plus or minus two and a 
quarter percent fluctuation band.  All the ERM member 
states agreed to maintain the exchange rate of their 
currencies within this band.  Periodic devaluations of 
member currencies did occur, but the ERM succeeded in 
keeping inflation stable, for the member countries, through 
the 1980’s.14  Britain again abstained and did not join the 
ERM until 1990.  Between 1980 and 1990 the pound fluctuated 
relative to the DM in a band of plus or minus twenty 
percent.15 
Britain joined the ERM in 1990 and, for the first 
year, it had the desired effect of stabilizing inflation 
for Britain while the economy was in a recession and 
unemployment was high.16  Problems emerged as it became 
clear that the pound had been overvalued in the ERM at 
2.95DM/1£ and inflationary pressures in Germany caused by 
the reunification of East and West Germany.17  In the second 
year of its membership in the ERM, the pound continued to 
fall against the DM as a result of currency speculation.  
The Bank of England had to take one of two measures to 
adhere to ERM rules; devalue the pound or raise interest 
rates to stabilize the currency.  Great Britain refused the 
former on the general principal that the pound did not 
deserve the same treatment as weak European currencies such 
as the lira or the peseta.  The latter was also not 
                     14 Thomas Pugel and Peter Lindert, International Economics: Eleventh 
Edition (Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 2000), 566. 
15 Pugel and Lindert, 567. 
16 Young, 437. 
17 Robin Bladen-Hovell, “The European Monetary System” in The 
Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis ed. Mike Artis and 
Norman Lee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 341 and Young, 365. 
8 
possible because it would have been stifling for the ailing 
British economy.  This vicious cycle of logic kept the Bank 
of England paralyzed.  Eventually, when it did raise rates 
from ten to twelve percent and then to fifteen in a final 
desperate attempt to keep the pound from sliding further, 
it had no result.  Their failure to maintain its exchange 
rate left the British government with no option but to 
withdrawal from the ERM in disgrace.18 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 renamed the European 
Economic Community the European Union, but more 
importantly, it created broad economic, social and 
political modifications to the face of Europe.  
Economically, Maastricht formed the European Central Bank 
(ECB), based upon the German Bundesbank model and initiated 
plans to create a unified European currency.19  It is of 
significance that Britain’s turbulent experience in the ERM 
was the backdrop against which vital EU negotiations were 
being conducted at Maastricht.  Citing domestic concerns 
over the convergence of the British economy with that of 
the rest of the EU, Prime Minister John Major was able to 
negotiate an ‘opt-out’ clause for Britain. This would allow 
his country to choose to remain outside the EMU even if it 
met the economic criteria for membership.20  Britain 
eventually ratified the Treaty of Maastricht but maintained 
its monetary independence.  Twelve of fifteen EU decided to 
move ahead with the EMU.  Only Britain, Sweden and Denmark 
elected to ‘opt-out’. 
                     18 Bladen-Hovell, 342 and Young, 439. 
19 Mike Artis, “European Monetary Union” in The Economics of the 
European Union: Policy and Analysis ed. Mike Artis and Norman Lee 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3611 and Young, 388-389. 
20 Bulmer, 23-24. 
9 
B. NATIONALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN 
This thesis illustrates particular paradoxes of 
nationalism which exist in present-day Britain.  The 
paradoxes have emerged in part from the changes in British 
national identity.  They have also emerged as a result of 
the ways in which nationalist sentiment has been tapped by 
politicians to achieve their political objectives since 
1973.  These paradoxes revolve around sterling and defence, 
two institutions which have come to embody the sovereign 
national identity of Britain.  These two icons are by no 
means the only sources of national identity for the 
British.21  Never the less, they are important, and potent 
in the British psyche when invoked.  This thesis strives to 
illuminate some of the sources and resulting consequences 
of these powerful symbols.  Chapter II will track the 
changing connection between sterling and defence under 
varying international currency orders from 1879 to 1973.22  
                     21 In fact, some contemporary British politicians like John Major 
have attempted to tap into pastoral, sentimental and indeed more 
‘English’ forms of British nationalism.  Major often evoked images of 
cricket on the green and warm beer, cited from, Kenneth Lunn, 
“Reconsidering ‘Britishness’: The Construction and Significance of 
National Identity in Twentieth-Century Britain” in Nation and Identity 
in Contemporary Europe, ed. Brian Jenkins and Spyros Sofos (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 86. 
22 The term ‘order’ is used here interchangeable with ‘regime’ as 
Robert Gilpin does in The Political Economy of International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 75.  The definition 
of ‘order’ is the one proposed by Robert Mundell in his article, “The 
Future of the International Financial System.”  Mundell makes the 
distinction between a monetary system and a monetary order in the 
following way: “A system is an aggregation of diverse entities united 
by regular interaction according to some form of control.  When we 
speak of the international monetary system we are concerned with the 
mechanisms governing the interactions between trading nations, and in 
particular the money and credit instruments of national communities in 
foreign exchange, capital and commodity markets.  The control is 
exerted through policies at the national level interacting with one 
another in that loose form of supervision we call co-operation.  An 
order, as distinct from a system, represents the framework and setting 
in which the system operates.  It is a framework of laws, conventions, 
regulations and mores that establish the setting of the system and the 
understanding of the environment by the participants in it…We can think 
10 
Chapter III will illustrate, from a dispassionate, non-
nationalistic perspective, the reality of the contemporary 
relationship between the pound and defence.  Chapter IV 
will deal with the evocations of nationalist sentiment on 
both subjects since 1973 when sterling and defence lost 
their last practical connection.  However, before examining 
contemporary appeals to nationalism in Britain, a general 
understanding of nationalism and its form in Britain is 
required. 
Nationalism has risen in large part as a result of the 
increasing alienation of the industrialized world, 
solidification of political authority into nation-states 
and the devolution of sovereign power to the populace 
through mass democracy.23  Nationalism has come to its most 
potent form as a result of the French Revolution of 1789 
when the two concepts of patriotism and popular sovereignty 
were fused together.  The elements from which national 
identity are created pre-date the French Revolution.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, the modern nation, as it first 
began to emerge in sixteenth century England, will be 
considered.24  Nationalism is a force which provides 
identity to groupings of people who otherwise would have 
                     
of the monetary system as the modus operandi of the monetary order.” 
Cited from Ronald I. Mackinnon, “The Rules of the Game: International 
Money in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 
31, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), 1. 
23 There is extensive emerging literature on nations and nationalism 
as a potent, and often massively destructive, force in the modern era.  
The objectives of this field of study is not with the intention of 
forwarding the claims of specific nations but rather to expose its 
specific attributes, manifestations and periods.  See David Miller, On 
Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: 
Programme, Myth and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
24 Greenfeld, 4. 
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nothing in common.  This shared identity is partly a 
psychological phenomenon, but more significantly, a 
political one.  Nationality is, to quote David Miller, 
…a community (1) constituted by shared 
belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in 
history, (3) active in character, (4) connected 
to a particular territory, and (5) marked off 
from other communities by its distinct public 
culture.25 
 
The concept of ‘nation’ is wholly that; a concept, a 
fabrication, a myth based upon a perceived or imagined 
commonality.26 This shared identity is often achieved 
through the creation of an imagined opposite from which a 
people can distinguish themselves from others.  The ‘other’ 
embodies the characteristics which are not attributable to 
the nation striving to define itself.27 
In examining the phenomena of nationalism in Great 
Britain this thesis is pursuing a path of identifying the 
national character of a nation which lacks a national 
ethnic cohesion.28  Linda Colley observes the same reality 
in her study of nationalism in Britain, Britons: Forging 
                     25 Miller, 27. 
26 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 6-7 also in Paul 
Gilbert, The Philosophy of Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1998), 154-169.  
27 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the 
Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 271. 
Cited in Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 5-6. 
28 Peter Scott, Knowledge and Nation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1992), 168.  British identity is the fusion of what could have 
been more accurately expressed as four ethno-centric nations, English, 
Welsh, Scottish and Irish.  Despite the strong influences of all these 
nations on the identity of Britain, British identity is drawn mostly 
from that of England, Stephen Haseler, The English Tribe: Identity, 
Nation and Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 28-33 and in Lunn, 
87. 
12 
the Nation 1707-1837.29  This is an important point, for in 
the creation of a nation-state without ethnic cohesion, 
national myths and symbols become important for unity in 
different ways.  Colley’s work is an appropriate starting 
point as it ends roughly at the point at which this thesis 
begins.  This thesis will extrapolate from the currents 
that Colley establishes as foundations of British 
nationalism.  She explains that British identity emerged as 
a result of three shared experiences.  The first was a 
common Religious identity in Protestantism.  The second was 
shared struggle in military conflict.30  The third was 
shared interests in trade and the Empire and the 
Constitutional connections that consequently formed between 
Scotland and the rest of the island because of the Empire.31  
These foundations helped to generate other rising 
expectations, which Colley explains, in turn further 
refined British identity.32 
This thesis will explore the relationship between two 
of these threads.  The first is military conflict and 
defence.  The second is trade and the Empire which 
experienced an evolution as the nature of the Empire 
changed.  The gradual shifting away from the exclusivity of 
mercantilism towards free trade in the middle of the 1800’s 
placed a new premium upon the strength of currency.33  Thus, 
the ‘cult of trade’ became the ‘cult of sterling’.  The 
                     29 Colley, 5. 
30 The military conflicts that most helped to shape British identity 
were the ones with Catholic France.  France here served as the ‘other’ 
against which Britishness was shaped. 
31 Colley, 7 and 364-375. 
32 Colley, 371. 
33 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and 
Expansion 1688-1914 (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 73-74. 
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focus on defence and currency is not to ignore the other 
factors that Colley presents.  However, there is evidence 
that in contemporary Britain the importance of Protestant 
cohesion is dwindling.34  This decline of common identity 
may be contributing to the modern movements calling for 
greater Scottish (Welsh and even English) self-governance.35  
Regardless, the changes highlight the significance of 
examining the nationalist elements of defence and currency 
in Great Britain. 
As will be shown in Chapter II, after 1879, the 
strength of the pound sterling and the strength of British 
defence entered into a reciprocal relationship, each 
working to maintain the other.  Thereafter, the strength of 
sterling became a point of shared national prosperity and 
pride on par with defence.  This new dynamic developed into 
the norm for the political elite which in turn infused this 
concept upon the polity.  As Colley has shown, British 
nationalism and patriotism, while a contrivance, is based 
upon real interests and not simply chauvinistic 
aggression.36  Chapter II will show that in using force to 
back the strength of the pound, Britain had real national 
interests at stake.  Therefore, the extension of British 
                     34 Miller, 170. 
35 For example, the Scottish National Party (SNP), a centre-left 
party favoring Scottish independence from Great Britain, is currently 
the second most popular political party in Scotland.  The SNP achieved 
minor successes in the mid-1970’s, but from 1988 to present it has 
achieved consistent electoral success passing 20% of the Scottish vote 
in every general, European Parliament, district and regional council 
elections.  A Scottish Parliament was created by a referendum held in 
1997 with the first elections in 1999.  http://www.fact-
index.com/s/sc/scottish_national_party.html#Electoral%20Performance 
September 2004. 
36 Colley, 371-372. 
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nationalism to preserving a strong pound is a reasonable 
result.37 
Certainly other issues are critical to understanding 
British nationalism in the second phase of imperial 
expansion and into the twentieth century.  The experiences 
of the First and particularly the Second World Wars have 
heightened the British sense of ‘otherness’ when looking 
across the English Channel at the continent.38  
Additionally, there are very real reasons for Britain to 
approach EMU with caution.  There is heated debate on 
whether EMU is good or bad economically for Britain because 
of unique conditions.  What is clear is that since the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods order, when monetary and 
military strength ceased to be one and the same, British 
politicians have resorted, with some success, to evoking 
the national icons of defence and sterling as a way of 
achieving their objectives.  The fact that this has been 
done, and that nationalist sentiment in the population 
allows it to be a functional tool for those who would 
employ it, has created the modern paradoxes of sterling, 
defence and the euro. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Both literally and metaphorically, the United Kingdom 
stands on the periphery of Europe.  This reality is both a 
product of physical isolation which has sheltered the 
United Kingdom from many of the social, economic, military 
and political forces that shaped the identity of 
                     37 Miller, 100-101.  He explains that nationalistic dedication to a 
domestic currency is a realistic extension of the concept of national- 
self-determination. 
38 Drew Middleton, The Supreme Choice: Britain and Europe (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963), 4-10, Giles Radice, Offshore: Britain and 
the European Idea (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Publishers, 1992), 22-28, 
Nunn, 88-98 
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continental Europe.  Military strength, diplomatic prowess, 
early industrialization, and relatively peaceful 
democratization in Britain have made it the subject of much 
study and distinction from the modern European identity.  
Considering these factors it is not surprising that the 
United Kingdom has not ‘fit’ with the process of European 
integration that began with the European Coal and Steel 
Community.  Consequently, the United Kingdom has often been 
called the ‘awkward partner’ of Europe.39  This specifically 
references the behavior of Britain towards Europeanization 
and the standoffish position it has taken.  The off-shore 
mentality of Britain has been a common current running 
through the political class in Britain that, “…the island 
nation belonged not to the continent but to the world…”40  
Michael Hogan has commented that the British in the late 
1940’s, “preferred their own room with connecting doors to 
the U.S. and the Continent and protested when the Americans 
suggested a suite with the Europeans.”41 
From 1890 to 1945 British military forces played a key 
role in protecting the pound and its global power through 
the Empire and Commonwealth.  In the decades following 
World War Two, British behavior shifted little.  It 
continued to act as if it were a great military and 
monetary power.  The United Kingdom met with varying 
success when it used military power to maintain monetary 
strength between 1945 and 1973.  Increasingly, fiscal 
                     39 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain and the European 
Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
40 Young, 43-44. 
41 Hogan made the comment upon the publishing of his book, The 
Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) quoted 
in Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European 
Community (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1999), 24.   
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concerns would be central to defence issues.  Finally, in 
1973, the collapse of Bretton Woods would sever any 
connection between monetary and defence policies and leave 
only a fiscal link.  However, at times, currency and 
defence have been resurrected as national icons of identity 
in order to achieve political, personal or strategic 
objectives.   
The result has been the creation of twin paradoxes in 
contemporary British politics.  The first paradox is the 
Tories, the party at present most dedicated to nationalism, 
cannot seize the euro as a means to improve defence.  The 
second is Labour, the party of the euro, is unable to 
convince the population of its benefits.  Therefore, to 
prove to other EU states the sincerity of its intentions, 
Labour enters into military agreements with the EU which it 
might not otherwise have if EMU membership were possible.  
These paradoxes and the actions and inactions that result 
from them present a threat to British power.  The 
dedication to the pound, in keeping Britain out of the EMU 














II. BRITISH DEFENCE AND MONETARY POLICY 1879-1973 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  The first is 
to display the economic origins of the United Kingdom’s 
historical preference for credible and substantial defence 
forces.  This will be accomplished primarily through an 
abbreviated narration of British military efforts and 
central defence issues from 1879 to 1973.  The primary 
focus will be on the time period from 1945 to 1973.  This 
is not to ignore some of the issues that arose prior to the 
end of the Second World War.  Rather the events prior to 
1945 will be used as the template for comparing and 
contrasting the shifting relationship between defence and 
currency after.  This theme is the second point of this 
chapter and is of the greater importance. 
The second purpose is central to the theme of this 
thesis which concerns the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of British 
defence forces in the global strategic sense.  
Specifically, this chapter will examine the connection 
between British military forces, their use internationally 
and the international position of the pound sterling.42  As 
                     42 A great deal of research has been conducted on British foreign and 
defence policy between 1805 and 1973 and the intertwined relationship 
between them and the international position of sterling in the Empire, 
Commonwealth, Sterling Area and the world economy.  Among them are two 
volumes from P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 
Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (London and New York: Longman, 1993) 
and British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990. (London 
and New York: Longman, 1993), Edward Grierson, The Death of the 
Imperial Dream: The British Commonwealth and Empire 1775-1969 (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1972) and C.J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short 
History of Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1972).  For detailed 
issues relating to the pound sterling and its international role see, 
Sir Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: A History of English Money 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) and for a general overview of 
the global context of Great Britian role in the modern world see 
William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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this chapter considers the status of sterling in an 
international context, the primary focus of analysis will 
be on periods in which international currency orders have 
been in place.43  This focus is not to the exclusion of 
periods when currency orders have not been active.  In 
fact, several examples will show how Britain maneuvered 
during periods of war and inconvertibility of currencies 
based upon speculation of future currency orders. 
The premise of this chapter draws its inspiration from 
the work of Susan Strange in 1971 on British behavior in 
international currency orders.  Strange asserts that 
Britain’s contemporary behavior in the international 
economy was shaped by preferences formed in the second half 
of the 19th century.  In this the period of late imperialism 
the most important factor became the centrality of the 
pound sterling as an international vehicle, exchange and 
reserve currency.44  Sterling was the first currency to 
assume such a role on a global scale.  Strange observes 
that in the late 19th century the central focus of British 
commercial activity shifted away from manufacturing and 
                     43 Ronald J. McKinnon, “The Rules of the Game: International Money in 
Historical Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 31, No. 1 
(Mar., 1993): 3.  McKinnon proposes a taxonomy of currency regimes 
since 1879 periods of which will be used to illustrate British defence 
behavior in context. 
44 A vehicle currency is one used to transition from one relatively 
minor currency to another.  For example f one wished to convert Thai 
bhat into South African rand, because there is virtually no market for 
doing so, the baht would first be used to purchase a major currency 
such as sterling, dollars or euros and then use that to purchase rand.  
An exchange currency is one used in international trade transactions 
regardless because of its accepted international value.  For example a 
nation in South American may use American dollars to purchase oil from 
Africa.  A reserve currency is one held in significant quantities by 
central banks of nations outside the nation which produces the currency 
for domestic use.  A reserve currency is held by central banks for 
numerous reasons, long term investment, to back the domestic currency 
or to use in foreign transactions. 
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industry.45  Britain developed as the first industrial 
nation and this domestic capability had been the 
cornerstone of mercantilism.  Britain’s move away from 
domestic industry was the result of greater interest in 
finance, investment and insurance and was built upon the 
position of sterling within the international gold system.  
In this capacity, the City of London served as the center 
both for the international gold trade and international 
finance.46 
From 1879 to the outbreak of the First World War the 
international monetary order was based upon gold reserves.47  
Sterling in this period is classified as being both a ‘top’ 
and ‘master currency’.  A top currency refers to its status 
as the première vehicle, exchange and reserve currency.  
Sterling’s status as the international top currency was a 
product of the substantial gold reserves of the Bank of 
England as well as its designation within the British 
Empire as the master currency.  A master currency is one 
that is designated by a political power as the required 
currency of a given area of territories outside the home 
nation.48  In this case, the United Kingdom made sterling 
the only currency for trade with and within the Empire.  
Britain controlled directly or indirectly a substantial 
portion of the world’s resources and population at this 
time.49  Global trade hinged on sterling and it maintained 
                     45 Susan Strange, “Sterling and British Policy: A Political View,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1971): 305-307. 
46 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, 
141-180. 
47 McKinnon, 3. 
48 These definitions of master and top currencies are taken from 
Strange, 306. 
49 From 1850 to 1914, the Empire, colonies, protectorates and 
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the preeminent position in the international currency 
order.50 
Strange makes the case that the government’s 
preference for maintaining the international position of 
sterling has its roots in the late 19th century change in 
focus to international banking, finance and insurance.  As 
the world’s banker, lucrative overseas investments shifted 
Britain’s financial interests away from investment in 
domestic manufacturing.  Britain would act less and less as 
a source of finished goods to the primary producing world 
as it had in classic mercantilism.51  This preference 
changed the reasons for maintaining the Empire, placing an 
even greater emphasis on monetary policy and maintaining a 
strong pound.  As a result, argues Strange, despite the 
fact that the post World War Two era showed that the pound 
was no longer the global top currency, the United Kingdom 
felt the need to continue to act to protect its monetary 
strength and took other diplomatic steps to ensure its 
position.52 
It is the central proposition of this chapter that 
British defence policy followed a similar path as its 
monetary policy.  As Britain became the leader in global 
finance British defence policy and action shifted from 
                     
commonwealth states included in their number Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, East Africa (Rhodesia), Egypt, Pakistan, India, 
Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong and present day Kuwait, Iraq and 
Palestine.  Sterling was the only currency used in these areas.   
50 Strange, 302.  This was also observed by Patrick O’Brien and 
Caglar Keyder in Economic Growth in Britain and France 1780-1914: Two 
Paths to the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 
195-197. 
51 Alan Milward with George Brennan and Federico Romero, The European 
Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992), 392-395 as well as in Cain and Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 
1688-1914, 181-201. 
52 Strange, 302. 
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being in part influenced by protecting and opening markets 
for manufactured goods.53  Instead, defence policy and 
action was used to contribute to protecting the 
international position of the pound sterling.  The critical 
point is the difference between a fiscal motivation and a 
monetary motivation.  Military action to ensure national 
access to raw materials and markets is essentially a fiscal 
equation.  Doing so generates capital wealth for the 
nation’s tax base which, in turn funds the government and 
defence.  Military policy and efforts to protect the 
international strength of a currency is similar because 
while it generates wealth, notably for the City of London, 
but it also brings global economic influence through the 
Bank of England.54  However, to conduct such a policy 
requires actions based on different priorities than in 
classic mercantilism. 
This chapter will illustrate how since the Second 
World War Britain has at times tried to use its military 
and defence policy as a type of support for monetary 
policy.  The most important insight is that of the glacial 
shifting of economic realities.  Security and defence 
priorities for the United Kingdom have gradually moved back 
from monetary concerns to fiscal ones.  However, the long 
standing relationship between the pound and defence has 
welded the two into a common conception of sovereignty.  
Just as defence is the most critical definition of national 
sovereignty for most nations the pound plays a similar role 
for Britain. 
There are three time periods in Ronald McKinnon’s 
taxonomy of currency orders which will be highlighted here 
                     53 Cain and Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, 73-74. 
54 Cain and Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, 141-181. 
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and correspond to three periods of international monetary 
order.  The first period is the international gold standard 
from 1879 to 1914.  This period will be used as a type of 
control group for British military behavior based on Susan 
Strange’s assertion that this period became the norm for 
British monetary behavior.55  The second and third periods 
both occur during the Bretton Woods order from 1945 to 
1973.  This was a period of critical transition in which 
British military policy and activity displayed mixed 
behavior.  Security efforts tried to address monetary 
issues while facing rising fiscal constraints.  At the same 
time defence issues and policy unrelated to monetary 
objective played a key role often to the detriment of 
monetary concerns.56 
To examine British defence behavior in relation to the 
strength of the pound under Bretton Woods the period must 
be broken into two halves; 1945 to 1956 and 1956 to 1973.  
In these two sections defence policy had monetary concerns 
but with a differing focus on how to best support the 
pound.  From 1945 to 1956 the focus was on maintaining the 
viability of the Sterling Area with a lesser focus on the 
United States.  From 1956 to 1973 supporting United States 
security issues were central to maintaining a strong pound 
with the Sterling Area concerns being ancillary. 
                     55 Strange, 306-307. 
56 The ever increasing budgetary (fiscal) pressures generated by 
defence expenditure as a result of rapidly changing technology since 
the Second World War apply to all nations seeking the most modern 
defence systems.  An the reality of Great Britain’s particular 
experience with this phenomena can be found in Keith Hartley, The 
Economics of Defence Policy (London: Brassey’s, 1991) and will be 
discussed more in Chapter III of this thesis.   
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A. THE INTERNATIONAL GOLD STANDARD: 1879-1914 
The importance of the gold standard is a recurring 
theme in British economic history.  Indeed Britain had 
utilized gold to back its currency since the middle of the 
18th century.  However, McKinnon suggests that the gold 
standard did not become a global currency order until 1879.  
At that point every major industrial nation and most 
agrarian ones backed their currencies with gold.57  The 
international gold standard of this period is characterized 
by the following conditions, 
For a country to place its monetary system 
on a gold basis it had to agree to fix a gold 
value for its currency (also known as the ‘gold 
content’ of the currency); guarantee the 
interconvertability between its domestic currency 
and gold at a fixed official price; allow for a 
relatively free movement of gold into and out of 
the country; and ensure that the paper money that 
it put into circulation, as well as all the other 
means by which it settled its accounts, were 
backed by adequate gold reserves.  The great 
appeal of the gold standard was the belief that 
it kept prices and exchange rates stable.58     
 
Within the United Kingdom, the City of London and the 
Bank of England played key roles in the functioning of this 
international system.  As the center for international 
trade, finance and gold sales, London became the banker to 
the world.59  So intertwined were sterling and gold that the 
international gold standard as it existed prior to the   
First World War has often been called, ‘the sterling 
standard.’ 
                     57 McKinnon, 3. 
58 Russell Ally, “War and Gold – The Bank of England, the London Gold 
Market and South Africa’s Gold, 1914-1919,” in Journal of Southern 
African Studies Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1991): 222-223. 
59 Cain and Hopkins, Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 148-153.  
Also in Feavearyear, 314-317.  
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…sterling operated as an international 
currency on equal terms with gold.  Sterling was 
for many countries the normal means of settling 
trade indebtedness…  Apart from this trading use, 
sterling was used equally with gold as a means of 
settling international balances between 
countries…  Overseas banks in many countries held 
working balances of sterling…   Moreover in some 
countries, central banks held part or all their 
main reserve in sterling, preferring sterling to 
gold, partly for the interest which the sterling 
assets yielded, and partly because the bulk of 
their trade lay with the United Kingdom and 
sterling balances were a trade convenience.60    
 
The stability and strength of Great Britain’s 
international position rested upon the global influence of 
its currency.  Contemporary opinions maintained that this 
strength could be maintained only if the sterling remained 
convertible with gold.61 
A great deal of scholarship has been dedicated to the 
issue of why the United Kingdom conducted military 
operation in South Africa in the 1890’s culminating in the 
1899-1902 Anglo-Dutch South African War, often called the 
Boer War.  J.A. Hobson first suggested in 1900 that the war 
in South Africa had been stimulated by the need to maintain 
London’s access to the newly discovered gold fields in the 
Witwatersrand.62  Scholarship on the subject has illustrated 
that, in reality, a combination these economic motivations 
as well as local political and geostrategic concerns were 
                     60 W.M. Scammell, “The Working of the Gold Standard” in The Gold 
Standard in Theory and History ed. Barry Eichengreen (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1985), 104. 
61 See Pamphlets by the Gold Standard Fence Association, (London, 
1895) cited in Ally, 225. 
62  J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects 
(London, 1900), 240. 
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at the root of the war.63  None the less, the economic 
motivations were undoubtedly a factor in the decision to 
intervene in South Africa.  Doing so achieved the double 
purpose of maintaining the permanence of the London Gold 
Market and the international stability and credibility of 
the pound sterling.64  This example illustrates a critical 
link between British defence and monetary policy.  In 1899 
military forces were used to defend the international 
monetary preeminence of the pound.  This would become a 
template for British defence policies in the future. 
B. THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY ORDER: 1914-1945 
This chapter does not seek to explain the behavior of 
British defence policy during the First and Second World 
Wars.  It is without doubt that more pressing issues such 
as those of the European balance of power and national 
survival focused defence policy and military operations in 
this time period.  Moreover, from 1913 to 1945 there was no 
de facto global currency order.65  Clearly, British policy 
and the policy of other nations sought to enforce some 
currency order during the interwar period.  Arguably the 
failure of Britain or the United States to do so 
successfully contributed to the instability of the period.  
However, the importance of defending the international 
                     63  For a superb synthesis of the material see Ronald Hyam and Peter 
Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the 
Boer War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 37-56.  The 
authors synthesize the economic arguments of S. Marks and S. Trapido, 
“Lord Milner and the South African state reconsidered” in Imperialism, 
the state and the Third World ed. Michael Twaddle (London: Macmillan 
Publishers, 1992), 80-94 and P.J Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British 
Imperialism, 1688-2000 (London: Longman, 2001), with the geostrategic 
arguments of Iain R. Smith, The Origins of the South African War, 1899-
1902 (London: Longman, 1996) and A.N. Porter, Origins of the South 
African War: Joseph Chaimberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism, 
1895-1899 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980). 
64 Hyam and Henshaw, 37-39. 
65 McKinnon, 2. 
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position of sterling is highlighted in the United Kingdom’s 
behavior at the outset of the First World War and through 
to the Second. Through the First World War the Bank of 
England established special procedures to deal with 
settling gold accounts and maintaining access to sources of 
gold.66  The United Kingdom clung to the belief that 
retaining the gold standard would also retain the 
international position of sterling and the wealth and power 
that brought Britain. 
In the interwar period, with its gold reserves having 
been expended fighting the war, Britain sought to create a 
‘gold exchange standard’.  Under this mechanism, post-war 
European currencies would be reestablished using the 
sterling or dollar as the reserve rather than gold which 
would have aided in returning British finances to stability 
as well as extending British monetary dominance into 
Europe.67  Instead, there was a brief reassertion of the 
gold standard by the United States from 1925 to 1929.  
Although not classified as a currency order because only a 
few nations shifted their currencies to gold in the period, 
the preeminence of the American economy made this decision 
a reality every nation had to deal with.  The United 
Kingdom attempted to adhere to it without devaluing the 
pound in order to retain the strength of the City of 
London’s financial sector.  The collapse of the gold 
standard in 1929 with the Wall Street crash paved the way 
for a new era for sterling where it could maintain a type 
of global preeminence. 
                     66 Ally, 227-230. 
67 Cain and Hopkins, Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 63-64 and 
Keylor, 131. 
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In 1931, Great Britain, in a landmark decision in 
international monetary history, shifted its monetary policy 
away from the Gold Standard, and focused on the Sterling 
bloc as the basis for international monetary strength.  The 
creation of the Sterling Area and the Ottawa Conference of 
1932 marked the descent of sterling from the ‘top currency’ 
status which it had prior to 1913 to that of a ‘master 
currency’.68  The Sterling Area was a new mechanism, created 
in part by John Maynard Keynes.  It established reserve 
requirements in sterling for nations which had close 
economic ties with the United Kingdom.  Essentially 
sterling became the gold reserve of the area which 
encompassed all of the Empire where the reserves were 
mandatory.  This included Australia, New Zealand, Siam 
(Thailand) and Ireland.  Other countries participating in 
the Sterling Area held balances in sterling but reserve 
totals were not mandated included British Malaya, Denmark, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Hong 
Kong, India, Pakistan, Portugal and South Africa.69  The 
Sterling Area would survive the Second World War, with some 
small modifications to its membership.  The Sterling Area, 
owing in part to its large size and diverse economic 
production and trade would continue to serve as a base for 
the sterling’s international power. 
C. THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: 1945-1973 
The 1945 Bretton Woods system was the first 
international currency order since the 1879-1913 Gold 
Standard.  The painful lessons of cascading international 
                     68 In the context of the period, global economies were in spasms and 
inflation was rampant as a result of the cascading effects of the 1929 
Wall Street Crash.  The Sterling Area established protectionist tariffs 
to defend the users of sterling world-wide from these effects.     
69 Cain and Hopkins, Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 76-93. 
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collapse in the interwar years had convinced even those, 
Keynes among them (who had earlier vehemently supported the 
gold standard) that a more flexible international monetary 
order was needed.  The sprit of Bretton Woods had intended 
to give each nation the ability to establish inflationary 
and employment goals for their domestic economies.  This 
was to be accomplished by demonetizing gold.  In practice, 
Bretton Woods was a system wherein the dollar was the new 
gold standard.  The centrality of the American economy in 
the post World War Two environment made dollar reserves an 
essential factor for maintaining a strong currency.70 
Britain entered into this new order as the lead nation 
in its own currency order.  Britain was still the leader of 
its master currency area, the Sterling Area.  In this 
regard, Britain fell into a special subsidiary category of 
currencies, those which, 
…have slipped from their former status…as 
top currencies…The issuing state, in order to 
avoid monetary embarrassment, thus becomes 
involved in a negotiating posture, offering 
inducements to users of the currency that may 
range from profitable rates of interest and value 
guarantees to commercial preferences or even to 
non-economic benefits of political assistance or 
military protection.71 
 
In 1945 the global strength of the pound was far from 
sapped.  Even by 1960 forty percent of global trade was 
conducted in pounds and only twenty-five percent in 
dollars.72 
                     70 McKinnon, 13-19. 
71 Strange, 306. 
72 Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic 
Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 73.  In the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s there was still incomplete economic information indicating 
exactly how high a percentage of world trade was conducted in sterling.  
Some estimates range as high as 50% as seen in Sir Leslie Rowan, Arms 
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The critical difference between the dollar and the 
pound after the war was that Britain exacted its power from 
the wealth generated by the use of the sterling as a trade 
and finance currency.  The dollar was based on the strength 
of the growing American industrial economy which generated 
wealth from exports.  This is illustrated by the fact that 
one of the most important contributions of the Sterling 
Area was that of its dollar pooling requirements.  Any 
dollars acquired by Sterling Area countries, mostly through 
raw material exports to the United States, had to be pooled 
with the Bank of England.  This mechanism, in combination 
with Marshall Plan aid,73 allowed Britain to clear its 
dollar debt to the United States.74 
The focus of this period will be upon Britain’s 
behavior as head of its master currency area and the 
military commitments.  During the period of the Bretton 
Woods order, from 1945 to 1973, military policy was used in 
part to uphold the stability of the pound.  This was 
despite the realities that increasingly defence policy was 
unable to do so.  This is evidenced by the fiscal 
constraints of defence commitments.  This time period will 
be handled in two halves.  The first period was from 1945 
to 1956, when Britain sought to continue to use defence 
policy and direct military intervention to defend the 
viability of the Sterling Area.  The second period was from 
1956 to 1973, when this type of intervention became a tool 
                     
and Economics: The Changing Challenge, Lee Knowles Lectures for 1960 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) 24. 
73 Cain and Hopkins, Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 273. 
74 Gerold Krozewski, “Sterling, the ‘Minor’ Territories, and the end 
of Formal Empire, 1939-1958,” The Economic History Review, New Series, 
Vol. 46, No. 2, May 1993): 243-251.  
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to induce the United States to defend the monetary position 
of the pound. 
The international strength of the pound was a central 
policy objective of the British government.75  The purpose 
of doing so was to retain the importance of the power of 
the City of London as the central hub for international 
trade and finance and thus the international strength of 
Great Britain.76  To do so, the pound had to have and retain 
a high value relative to the dollar.  The pound’s value 
under Bretton Woods was originally set at $4.03 but faced a 
major crisis in 1949 that forced it to devalue to $2.80.  
British governments of the left and right would hold the 
line on this value until 1967.  However, the means of using 
defence policy to do so would change.  From 1945 to 1956 
the military defence of the Sterling Area as the anchor of 
the international position of sterling was a primary 
concern.  However, in the context of the developing Cold 
War, the British government began to feel the pull of two 
competing forces.  The first was the need to protect the 
monetary stability of the pound and the second the fiscal 
                     75 A critical issue of returning the pound to its former strength 
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the 1950’s in Europe can be found in Alan Milward with George Brennan 
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constraints of defence.  The balancing of these two forces 
would characterize British behavior in the period from 1945 
to 1973. 
1. British Defence Under Bretton Woods: 1945-1956 
An examination of British military interventions 
between 1945 and 1973 yields a direct correlation between 
British military action and the Sterling Area.  Scholars 
have observed, with some perplexity, that Britain’s 
militancy in this period defies the logic of a medium 
power.  This is based on the assumption that only a great 
power would risk war for small objectives.  Often such 
military action is attributed to some sort of Imperial 
hangover in which the state acts simply out of habit and 
not a rational decision.77  However, the three conditions 
that characterized British limited military intervention in 
this period make the motivation clear.  Between 1945 and 
1973 intervention occurred, with only one exception, when 
established authorities requested assistance, when 
political violence erupted and when there was an advanced 
presence of British armed forces.  With the exception of 
the Korean War and the Suez Crisis of 1956, both of which 
will be addressed later, all military interventions 
occurred within the former territories of the Empire.78 
While British military intervention in these regions 
cannot be explained in terms of balance of power theory, 
the monetary concerns of Britain provide insight into 
motivation.  Territories such as Malaya and Kenya may not 
have had an important geo-strategic position or been a 
major source of trade with the United Kingdom, but the                      77 John Van Wingen and Herbert Tillema, “British Military 
Intervention after World War II: Militance in a Second-Rank Power,” 
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 17, No. 4, (1980): 291. 
78 Van Wingen and Tillema, 295. 
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regimes in power were part of the Sterling Area.  As such 
they constituted important holders of sterling reserves.  
As the other portions of the Empire, such as India and 
Pakistan, moved to Commonwealth status and these lesser 
territories increased their sterling reserve holdings.79  
Therefore they became of greater importance to the 
international strength of sterling.  Admittedly, there were 
additional factors that influenced the British willingness 
to intervene in the former imperial territories.  The 
protection of British citizens was clearly important at 
times.80  However, given the rising importance of these 
minor territories for the global strength of sterling, 
military intervention by the British government to support 
the governments dedicated to the Sterling Area and holding 
considerable balances was in the interest of the British 
government.81  In fact, defensive arrangements made with 
Malaya in the early 1950’s to convince them to stay in the 
Sterling Area continued into the mid 1960’s.82 
The sizable British commitment to the Korean War 1950 
to 1953 was in a way an exception to the rule of British 
motivation for defence policy which has been proposed.  The 
British sought to influence American policy in Korea by 
contributing to the military effort.  Based upon similar 
lessons from the Alliance effort in World War Two, the 
British did have significant influence over American 
decisions regarding the conduct of the war.83  However, this 
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discrepancy can be partly explained by what would later 
become the essential focus of British defence policy, 
American economic aid.  The Marshall Plan was contributing 
substantial dollar investment into the British economy 
between 1948 and 1952 and this assuaged the balance of 
payments deficit that Britain was incurring.84 
Not as easily reconciled were the balance of payments 
problems that the United Kingdom was experiencing vis-à-vis 
their troop commitment to the defence of Europe.  From 1952 
to 1955, the German government paid an occupation cost of 
600 DM per month to the British government to cover the 
costs of the nearly one hundred thousand British troops 
defending Germany against Soviet aggression.  These 
occupation costs became the more general support costs paid 
by the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 to 1961.  
Support costs were various forms of compensation, from 
direct cash payments to commitments to purchase arms which 
caused capital to flow from Germany to Britain.  The 
primary motivation was not to pay for the expenses of the 
soldiers since Britain was willing to cover the costs of 
paying, equipping and maintaining their troops.  The 
problem for Britain was the balance of payments.  Britain 
argued that maintaining troops in Germany cost the United 
Kingdom because it had to buy deutschmarks (DM) to pay the 
soldiers and to provision them.  Essentially the troops 
acted as a large permanent source of foreign debt.85 
The validity of these claims has been challenged by 
current scholarship.  In Money and Security: Troops, 
Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the                      84 Cain and Hopkins, Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 273. 
85 Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, 
and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-
1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26. 
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United States and Britain, 1950-1971, Hubert Zimmermann has 
shown that problems with British balance of payments 
resulted only in part from exchange losses due to troop 
maintenance.  What is important to note is not that dollar 
shortages in British reserves was due to weak domestic 
industry but that the cost of maintaining troops became the 
convenient scapegoat for the British government.  Thus, 
regarding the defence policy of presence in Germany, 
Britain acted as if it were a drain on the monetary 
strength of sterling.  Therefore in negotiations with the 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany the British 
constantly threatened to reduce their troop numbers for 
this reason.86  Subsequently, the German government agreed, 
despite its initial intransigence, to pay support costs 
which were often thirty percent higher per soldier that the 
Germans paid the American government.87  The willingness to 
leverage defence policy to defend the pound illustrates the 
primacy that monetary strength played in the British 
political psyche of the day.  This example also shows how 
the British successfully used their military policy to 
effectively funnel money from Germany to support their own 
flawed domestic economy.88 
The critical watershed for British defence policy from 
1945 to 1973 occurred in 1956 during the Suez Crisis.  The 
failure to achieve their objectives illustrated three 
critical points which have shaped British defence policy to 
the present day.  The first was the inability of the 
military to protect by force what monetary strength was 
left in the Sterling Area.  British motivation for seizing 
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the Suez Canal was in part a move to ensure trade with and 
thus the viability of the Sterling Area.89 The second was 
that real monetary strength rested in having the support of 
the United States.  The third was that a nuclear deterrent 
did not assure success in limited war.90  The first and 
second points are the most critical to this thesis because 
from 1956 on British defence policy would be heavily 
oriented towards the needs of the United States.  In this 
way, the traditional role of the military as protector of 
the international strength of the pound merely shifted from 
protecting the viability of the Sterling Area and the 
Empire to helping the United States to ensure continued 
American financial support of the pound. 
The Anglo-French-Israeli intervention in the Suez 
Canal zone in 1956 is often highlighted as the low point of 
relations in the western alliance since the end of the 
Second World War.  What is striking about it is the 
leverage of economic diplomacy it illustrates; this was not 
lost on the United Kingdom.91  Importantly, it was not 
forgotten by Harold Macmillan, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Macmillan would succeed Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden after the Suez debacle and have great influence over 
the shift in the orientation of British defence.92  The 
crisis was initiated by the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal by Egyptian leader Gammal Abdul Nasser in the summer 
of 1956.  The loss of the Suez Canal Company, and the 
associated revenues, was not of as great a concern as the 
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threat it posed to the cohesion of the Empire and the 
Sterling Area. 
The British decided upon military action in the Canal 
Zone because Nasser’s nationalization meant he could close 
the canal at his whim.93  This had two potentially choking 
effects for Britain.  First, seventy percent of Western 
Europe’s oil flowed through Suez.  Second, and of 
importance for this chapter, it was the vital sea link with 
what remained of the Empire and numerous states which held 
large sterling reserves.  Nations such as Kenya, Malaya, 
India, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan all maintained 
sizable sterling balances some because of Imperial fiat and 
some because of preferred Commonwealth trade status.94  If 
the Canal were to be closed, these nations would lose much 
of their reason for retaining large sterling balances.  In 
1956, the Bank of England was still maintaining sterling at 
a value of $2.80.  A reduction of holdings by the Sterling 
Area nations would lead to speculation and threaten the 
monetary strength of the pound. 
Ultimately the Suez intervention was a watershed 
because it proved to the British that the Sterling Area was 
no longer the most important factor in the strength of the 
pound.  As soon as the invasion began, there was a run on 
the pound in international markets.  This caused a sudden 
and massive outflow of British dollar reserves.  The Bank 
of England lost fifty million US dollars in two days.  The 
only way for Britain to remain solvent was to receive a 
loan from the International Monetary Fund and to get it 
required American approval.95  The Americans had been 
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deceived and uninformed about the Suez operation and felt 
it inappropriate in the context of other events in the Cold 
War.  Therefore, Eisenhower used this monetary advantage to 
force the British to pull out of Suez.  Doing so resulted 
in a collapse of the entire effort to retake the Suez.  
Diplomatically, the strain in the Anglo-American 
relationship resulted in immediate moves by the United 
Kingdom to repair the breach.96 
2. British Defence Under Bretton Woods: 1956-1973 
Following the Suez crisis the conversion of British 
defence policy towards its new priorities began in earnest. 
From 1956 to 1973 the focus shifted away from the 
protection of the Imperial territories, Sterling Area and 
Commonwealth as the foundation of the monetary strength of 
the pound.  The former empire would play a role but only in 
that it would be used as a stage in the greater battles of 
the Cold War.  American concerns over the ‘domino theory’ 
would influence British strategy, and British defence 
policy regarding the former Empire would be shaped by the 
ability of the United States to continue to underwrite 
British monetary stability.97  Additionally, new attention 
would be paid to rectifying the fiscal issues which plagued 
and stifled British economic recovery.  In this period the 
first shift in British defence policy as a tool to retain 
monetary strength can be seen.  Increasingly fiscal issues 
would play a greater role in defence priorities. 
The decreasing focus on retaining the power of the 
City through the international strength of the pound can be 
seen in several policy shifts which occurred in the wake of 
the Suez Crisis.  In 1958 the sterling was restored to full 
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convertibility with the dollar.  The minor territories, 
which had been carrying sizable sterling reserves, were 
given political independence.  The last fetters of 
mandatory sterling reserves were removed.  Although 
preferential trade arrangements remained and thus induced 
many nations to keep sterling for trade with Britain the 
quotas and dollar pooling arrangements were finished.98  
With the weak consumption economy in Britain and a strong 
one in the United States, increasingly the dollar would 
become the central vehicle and reserve currency of choice.  
In 1962 the United Kingdom first applied for membership in 
the European Economic Community (EEC).  The unwillingness 
of the Prime Minister Macmillan to end the system of 
Commonwealth agricultural preference would ultimately doom 
the 1962 application.99  However, the fact that Britain 
applied for membership in the Community, which it had 
previously shown no interest in, is of great import.  
Britain’s application illustrates that political and 
economic interests had shifted away from international 
finance with the pound as the vehicle and towards industry 
and trade in the competitive market of Europe.100 
The tension between monetary strength and the fiscal 
demands of defence policy can be clearly seen in the 
British pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent.  
Research has shown that rather than being a conscious 
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decision about strategy, the independent deterrent was 
sought by Britain as an economy measure prior to 1956.  In 
fact the British advocated the development of tactical 
nuclear weapons in the vein of President Eisenhower’s ‘New 
Look Army’ as far back as 1952.101  This vision became 
reality under Macmillan in the 1957 Defence White Paper 
introduced by Duncan Sandys.  The objectives of the 1957 
White Paper was to reduce the high fiscal costs of defence, 
cutting manpower nearly in half, ending conscription and 
reducing costs.  All of this would be achieved by 
increasing the combat fire power of ground forces by the 
introduction of tactical nuclear weapons.102 
The pressing fiscal realities of defence can also be 
seen in shifting British attitudes towards European defence 
procurement cooperation.  The 1960’s saw the start of 
numerous multinational European defence procurement 
efforts. The hope of these programmes, though not entirely 
fulfilled, was that they would generate fiscal savings 
through economies of scale and more effective pooling of 
research and development funds.103  Three major European 
weapons systems were started in the 1960’s and the United 
Kingdom was a member of every one; the Jaguar strike 
aircraft in 1965, the Puma, Gazelle and Lynx helicopter 
package in 1967 and the Tornado fighter/bomber in 1968.104 
Despite growing fiscal pressures, British defence 
policy in this period continued to show that it had some 
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uses in maintaining the monetary strength of the pound.  
This is evidenced in what has been called the ‘East of 
Suez’ debate.105  The 1965 Defence White Paper highlighted 
the need to cut spending further and overseas commitments 
seemed a likely source.  By 1966 it became clear to all 
that any British presence overseas required intense 
reevaluation.  Defending the Commonwealth was no longer a 
priority and the belief was rampant that Britain should 
withdraw from commitments east of the Suez Canal.  
Specifically this meant bases and defence commitments in 
India, Ceylon, Aden, Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
Arguments in favor of this withdrawal highlighted that the 
Commonwealth and sterling Area only contributed perhaps 
ninety million pounds a year to the British economy.106  
What those who debated in favor of a British withdrawal 
missed was the wider context of such an action during a 
‘hot’ period of the Cold War. 
American interests in Vietnam were rising and American 
policy there focused on the fear of a domino effect in the 
region, where consecutive south-east Asian nations might 
fall to communist rule.  As a result, the 1965 British 
Defence White Paper prompted concern from the American 
State Department.  British withdrawal, particularly from 
Malaysia and Singapore were potential strategic 
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disasters.107  This defence reappraisal coincided with 
another sterling crisis.  Speculation on sterling placed 
the $2.80 conversion rate again in doubt and with the pound 
being fully convertible it was even more exposed to rapid 
fluctuations on currency markets.  Only another loan would 
keep the pound stable.  The American State Department saw 
an opportunity and Under Secretary of State George Ball 
conditionally linked American support for the loan with 
further British commitment to hold their positions in 
south-east Asia.  Prime Minister Harold Wilson acquiesced 
and the pound was stabilized.108  The 1966 British Defence 
White Paper announced that Britain would pull its troops 
back from Aden but would stay in Malaysia and Singapore.  
British defence policy had again proved its ability to 
preserve the stability of the pound by backing American 
interests. 
The 1965 rescue of the pound would be the swansong of 
British defence policy being used to protect monetary 
policy.  The weakness of the British economy was showing 
and a crisis the following year would lead to the 1967 
devaluation of the pound to $2.40.  It would take only 
three years for Britain to successfully negotiate entry 
into the European Common Market. Doing so would require 
further cutting of ties with the Commonwealth nations, but 
their governments and a small populist movement in the 
United Kingdom were the only opponents.109  Convincing 
France that Britain was sincere about participation in 
Europe was the real challenge.110  The lack of concern for 
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the issue of the international strength of sterling in the 
domestic debate testifies to the limited role the Sterling 
Area played in the strength it had left.  As it turns out 
the British entered the EC just in time, the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1973 allowed all currencies to 
float.  The strength of a currency would now rest upon the 
confidence it held in international money markets. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has illustrated the intimate relationship 
between the pound and British defence policy.  Following 
the collapse of Bretton Woods and the advent of floating 
currencies, the final ties between defence policy and 
monetary strength were cut.  The balance of payments became 
less significant and national monetary policy now had 
little or no connection to international power.  With this 
end came too a collapse of British foreign and defence 
policy.  The objective of defending the strength and 
influence of the pound was gone and Britain would twist in 
the strategic winds of the Cold War.  Dean Acheson’s claim 
in his 5 December 1962 speech at West Point that, “Great 
Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role” 
was never more valid than in the 1970’s.  What is 
interesting is that the issues of monetary and defence 
policy would remain and reemerge as essential components of 
British sovereignty and identity.  They would no longer be 








III. THE BENEFITS OF EMU FOR BRITISH DEFENCE 
The pound has reached the end of its usefulness for 
British defence.  When considering the choice between it 
and the euro, the pound has become a hindrance to the 
fielding and employment of effective military forces.  
Membership in the European Monetary Union offers 
substantial benefits to Britain in the area of defence 
capabilities.  These capabilities are essential if Britain 
hopes to continue to influence world events and contribute 
to global stability.  The euro offers advantages over the 
pound by providing cost savings to the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD).  These cost savings will come by eliminating 
transaction and exchange rate losses for MoD for financial 
transaction involving the eurozone.  The euro offers the 
similar benefits for British defence industries and also 
should aid in further rationalizing the European defence 
market.  This will bring additional cost savings to the 
MoD.  Overall, this will improve the health of British 
defence industries while maintaining a necessary amount of 
strategic independence for Britain. 
These claims are based upon three factors which are 
converging to create a crisis for British defence.  These 
changing circumstances are partially a product of changes 
in the technological and security environment and are 
germane to many nations pursuing modern defence 
capabilities.  Of specific import to this thesis is that in 
contrast to the era prior to 1973, there is no connection 
between British defence policy and the monetary policy of 
the pound.  Ironically in fact, in strict economic terms, 
the euro is a favorable currency when considering the needs 
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of British defence.  The first of the three converging 
factors is the British preference for strong defence 
capabilities. The historical leanings of the United Kingdom 
towards the United States on security matters are not 
likely to shift in the near future.111  Neither the Tory nor 
Labour parties are advocating any break from solidarity 
from the United States, with the Tory opposition party 
having even stronger leanings towards America.112  In the 
mind of numerous British governments of both the left and 
right, having influence with America on strategic matters 
has meant providing credible forces to military efforts.  
This trend is not likely to change in any meaningful way in 
the near future. 
The second factor is more constrained defence budgets 
which will likely be the same or less, in real terms, as 
they are now.  Simultaneously, the rising cost, in real 
terms, of the most advanced and capable defence technology.  
The push and pull of democratic politics in the United 
Kingdom will certainly inch the budgets up or down 
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slightly, but even the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism 
has only moved budgets up less than ten percent.  The 
starting assumption of this chapter is that costs will 
continue to rise and budgets will continue to shrink or 
stay nearly he same in real terms.  These realities force 
the United Kingdom to deal with maintaining capability in 
the face of leaner fiscal realities.113  The euro offers 
savings to British defence budgets especially considering 
irrationality in defence markets. 
The third factor that will further stress British 
defence spending is the economically irrational nature of 
defence markets in general.  This is a challenging problem 
for the United Kingdom in two ways.  First is the ability 
to gain efficiencies from a larger market, while retaining 
national control over defence technology to be free from 
foreign interference.114  However choosing interdependence 
only poses a second problem.  On one side, the enormous and 
lucrative American market offers profits, but only by 
working as a sub-contractor for the large American firms.  
On the other side, the economically irrational European 
defence market which is trying to integrate but is fraught 
with inefficiency.  The United Kingdom already is driving 
integration and rationalization of the European defence 
market.115  This chapter argues that membership in the euro 
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will create MoD savings by offering efficiencies and spur 
integration of the European defence market.  This 
integration will have second order savings by making 
pooling of defence resources easier for Europe.  In 
addition to these savings, the MoD stands to save by making 
money spent in the eurozone less of a drain on the British 
economy. 
A. DECREASING BUDGETS AND RISING COSTS 
Economists often challenge that defence spending is a 
drain on the profitability of the private sector and public 
resources of a nation.  However, because defence is 
provided by the government as a public good it is difficult 
to evaluate its usefulness except in as much as the 
democratic system provides feedback to the government 
through elections.  This reality makes it difficult to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of defence spending.116  
What is certain is that nations will spend some amount of 
money on defence in the face of a perceived threat.  
Additionally, governments have to make choices about how to 
spend the limited resources they have to provide for 
national security. 
Since the end of the Second World War the United 
Kingdom has shown a preference for more significant defence 
spending than its European neighbors.  In the past twenty 
years the United Kingdom has consistently been among the 
top nations in Europe in terms of defence spending per 
capita and as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Changes in spending have maintained this proportionality in 
relation to the                       
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Continental states, especially following the end of the 
Cold War.117  From a peak of 5.3% of GDP spent under Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1986 to 2.4% of GDP in 2000, 
the British have taken the opportunity to slim down defence 
spending since the collapse of the Soviet 
threat.118
Figure 1. 119 UK Defence Spending as a Percent of GDP 
In the present day, only France, Greece, Turkey and 
Norway spend more as a percentage of GDP than the United 
Kingdom does.120  The reasons for the British preference 
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toward higher defence spending are many, but the fact that 
the priority exists is the primary point. 
The political inclination to field significant 
military forces is a given factor in contemporary British 
foreign policy.  Considering this, the government and 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) must then balance how to spend 
scarce resource dollars in the most cost effective way.  
Economic predictions and demographic changes in the United 
Kingdom yield the clear picture that even with the 
perceived threat of trans-national terrorism; budgets for 
the MoD are not going to increase by any significant amount 
in the future.  The contribution of the United Kingdom to 
the American-led Global War on Terrorism starting in 2001 
and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have resulted in modest 
increases.  Most likely they will continue to shrink over 
the long run.121  At the same time, the MoD is faced with 
increasingly complex and expensive defence technology whose 
costs grow at a greater rate than defence spending.122 
B. ECONOMIC RATIONALITY VERSUS STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE 
In the face of shrinking budgets and an autarkically 
inclined defence industry, removing all barriers to a 
totally rational defence market seems like a certain fix to 
the problem.  However, liberalization of the British 
defence market is more complex because of the strategic 
need to retain a modicum of independence.  The pursuit of 
equilibrium between strategic independence and domestic 
employment on one hand and the rationalization of the 
European defence market on the other is the critical issue                      121 Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, 26.  
122 This phenomena is well known in modern defence economics in 
general an for Britain in particular as seen in John Baylis ed., 
Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1983), 5, Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, and 
in Alexander and Garden, 561-563.  
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which the United Kingdom now faces.   To develop, acquire, 
maintain and operate advanced defence systems requires a 
large research and development budget, long project 
horizons and a defence contractor capable of handling these 
major and high tech projects.123  In spite of these rising 
equipment costs and decreasing budgets the British have 
continued to pursue a national military capability which is 
equipped with systems produced in the United Kingdom.  
While competition on about fifty percent of MoD contracts 
is open to foreign bidders, national law requires that 
ninety percent of orders go to domestic suppliers.124  This 
preference for maintaining a domestic defence industry is 
caused both by domestic concerns about employment but also 
for protecting a strategic capability to produce defence 
systems and thus retain strategic independence.125 
A domestic defence industrial complex is important to 
the United Kingdom for several reasons.  First, it provides 
some level of strategic independence by providing the 
capability of producing a needed defence system free from 
the meddling of a foreign government which may have the 
ability to manipulate the behavior of one of its domestic 
corporations regarding the needed system.  Obviously a 
nation would not consider purchasing its weapons from its 
arch rival or most likely opponent, but these types of 
pressures can come from neutral or allied nations.  The 
worst case scenario is illustrated by the efforts of the 
United States to block French nuclear weapon development by 
restricting the export of critical computers by IBM, an 
                     123 Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, 45-49. 
124 Cmnd 1022, 1990, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990 (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office). 
125 Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, 25. 
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American corporation, to France in 1966.  The blocking of 
these systems forced French development of a hydrogen bomb, 
and President Charles de Gaulle’s envisioned force de 
frappe, to come to a “grinding halt.”126  However, this need 
for autonomy must be balanced with the economic reality 
that even a national market of medium to large size cannot 
alone support the expensive research and development needed 
for modern and complicated defence systems.127  This is 
clearly the perspective of the Ministry of Defense which 
extols the economic virtues of improved international 
defense industry rationalization while retaining supply 
chain security and key technologies.128 
The second reason for having a domestic defence sector 
is actually a condition of the first.  If a nation wishes 
to maintain some strategic independence it must have a 
defence industry capable of developing and producing the 
most complex and advanced systems.129  It is not enough for 
a nation wishing to maintain strategic independence to have 
a defence sector; it must have a capable one in the most 
modern sense.  Otherwise the national defence industries 
simply become “metal bashers”.130  This expression refers to 
corporations that produce someone else’s products or act as 
a subcontractor, providing only small or insignificant 
components to larger systems.  This again is illustrated by 
the example of the French nuclear programme in the 1960’s.  
France at the time had a domestic arms industry but it was 
                     126 “America Says No,” The Economist, 16 June, 1966, p.1229. 
127 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Defence Occasional White 
Paper No. 5: Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, 15. 
128 Occasional White Paper No.5, 12. 
129 Moran, 97-99. 
130 Interview with Daniel Keohane, 5 November 2004, Center For 
European Reform, 29 Tufton Street, London, United Kingdom. 
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not capable of producing the most advanced systems needed 
to meet its national priorities and thus was subject to the 
leverage of a foreign government. 
The third reason for maintaining strong defence 
industries in the United Kingdom is that Britain already 
has a strong defence industry that provides direct 
employment to 345,000 Britons.  Maintaining these skilled 
workers is not only important to the strategic defence of 
the United Kingdom but to the economic well-being of the 
nation in general.  The defence industry accounts for three 
percent of the UK manufacturing output and has a turnover 
of £15 billion per annum.  This industry does not depend 
upon domestic demand alone; arms export contracts totaled 
£4.7 billion for the United Kingdom in 2000.  This places 
Britain second to the United States globally in value of 
arms exports taking fully twenty-one percent of the global 
market share.131  The export of weapons accounts for nearly 
two percent of all exports from the United Kingdom placing 
it eleventh globally in its proportion of arms exports to 
total exports.132  The sale of these advanced systems to 
other nations helps to improve the profitability of British 
corporations.  The United Kingdom’s largest defence 
contractor, BAE Systems, drew eighty percent of its sales 
from outside of Britain.  This is not unusual for the 
manufacturers of the most advanced and expensive weapons.  
Even the United States, with its massive internal defence 
market, must rely upon the foreign sales of its advanced 
                     131 Occasional White Paper No.5, 7. 
132World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000, U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Verification and Compliance (June 2002). 
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weaponry to provide much needed profits to its domestic 
arms industry.133 
It is clear that a sizable and sophisticated domestic 
industrial base is an important component of a credible 
defence capability for the United Kingdom.  However, 
research has shown that it is simply not financially 
feasible for any individual European nation to attempt to 
maintain an autarkic defence industrial policy.134  
Therefore, new solutions to the relationship between 
nations and their defence industrial bases are needed.  
What must be done is to balance the risk and manage 
carefully the dependence on foreign purchased weaponry.  
The best strategy for a nation considering the procurement 
of weapons for national defence is to diversify outsourced 
products to improve efficiency while retaining some 
domestic production to keep foreign dependence down.  The 
objectives of this type of 'globalized' procurement policy 
are numerous.  The first is to maintain some national 
capability and keep in economically healthy by exposing it 
to the competitive forces of the marketplace.  The second 
is for the government to acquire the most appropriate 
defence system at the best cost to taxpayers.  The third is 
to rationalize the process of acquiring defence systems in 
such a way as to allow choices to be made about what risks 
from acquiring foreign systems are acceptable to strategic 
independence and what are not.135  Membership in the EMU 
offers aid in a more globalized procurement strategy for 
the MoD by strengthening consolidation and collaboration. 
                     133 Moran, 57. 
134 Terrence R. Guay, At Arms Length: The European Union and Europe’s 
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The potential for the United Kingdom to field capable 
and cost-effective defence systems would be substantially 
improved by membership in the euro because it would improve 
the health of its domestic defence industry in two ways.  
Each of the potential effects could be of greater or lesser 
significance but both offer improved efficiency for the 
aquisition of defence systems by the United Kingdom.  
First, British membership would help with further 
rationalization of the European defence market through the 
consolidation of the European defence industries.  This is 
favorable to the United Kingdom because its large and 
capable defence firms are well positioned for acquisition 
or merger.  Secondly, adoption of the euro would also 
assist in the efficiency of joint European military 
projects which would offer substantial efficiencies in the 
market and improved defence systems. United Kingdom defence 
industries stand well positioned to lead and profit from 
these joint international projects. 
C. THE EURO AND DEFENCE MARKET CONSOLIDATION  
The United Kingdom has one major and numerous minor 
corporations which contribute to its defence industrial 
base.  BAE Systems (BAE) is the largest European defence 
contractor and has complex interests in numerous 
international ventures.  This includes a subsidiary in 
North America which has access to the lucrative United 
States defence market as a subcontractor.  BAE will be used 
here as an example of how membership in the EMU could help 
the defence industrial base of the United Kingdom.  Of the 
top ten defence corporations in the world, four are 
European based, BAE, THALES, European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company (EADS) and Finmeccanica.  These Big Four 
collectively drew $32.9 billion in revenue from defence 
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contracts in 2002 with BAE the clear leader at $15 billion.  
While able to generate revenue, the Big Four are not 
profitable when considering their ability to create 
significant operating cash flow.136  Of the four, only EADS 
has an operating cash flow above zero. 137   This creates 
problems for these firms to acquire debt and thus compete 
for major projects, make acquisitions and finance research 
and development.  This is illustrated by the fact that 
opportunities for mergers and acquisitions in the European 
market are often snatched out from under European buyers by 
their more solvent American counterparts.  This problem of 
solvency is reflected in financial markets as well, where 
the stocks of European defence firm consistently perform 
below those of their American competitors.138 
A source of the problem of insolvency in the European 
defence firms is that the market suffers from overcapacity.  
Consolidation is needed for the defence firms of Europe to 
continue to survive and thrive. There have been some 
efforts to sort out what is known as the ‘spaghetti-bowl’ 
of defence industries in Europe through acquisitions and 
mergers.  Despite these efforts, industrial consolidation 
has slowed down at the start of the 21st century.  The 
creation of EADS in 2000 out of three major aerospace 
corporations from France, Germany and Spain was the last 
major merger in the European defence industries.  Further 
                     136 Operating Cash Flow: The cash generated from the operations of a 
company, generally defined as revenues less operating expenses, but 
calculated through a series of adjustments to net income. OCF is 
arguably a better measure of profits than earnings are, because a 
company can show positive net earnings and still not be able to pay its 
debts. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/operatingcashflow.asp July, 
2004 
137 Kati Vlachos-Dengler, Off Track? The Future of the European 
Defence Industry (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), xvi-xvii. 
138 Vlachos-Dengler, 60-65. 
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consolidation is not likely given the current conditions in 
the market and the problems of solvency in major defence 
firms.139  However, European defence firms are striving to 
rationalize the market through the final removal of the 
remnants of nationalization.  In 2004 the Chairman of 
Thales, Denis Ranque, lobbied aggressively to get the 
French government to sell off its final thirty percent 
holdings in the company to foster rationalization and 
consolidation in the market.140 
By entering into the EMU, the defence firms of the 
United Kingdom would be better positioned to merge or 
purchase other eurozone defence firms.  For example a major 
firm like BAE may well be in good position to buy or merge 
with Finnmechanica, a small firm that is performing above 
normal expectations and has substantial ties with BAE 
already.141  By entering the euro, British defence firms 
could have access to reduced risk interest rates for 
capital investment.142  Currently eurozone interest rates 
are more than fifty percent less than that of the sterling.  
The greater size of the Eurobond market, twenty percent 
larger than the United States, would help provide capital 
for mergers and acquisitions as well.  By being able to 
denominate all its assets in euros, British firms access 
these sources of credit more efficiently and without 
transaction costs.  This access to greater debt could help 
alleviate some of the problems of solvency for a large 
                     139 Vlachos-Dengler, xvi-xvii. 
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British defence firm, giving it increase ability to borrow 
for acquisitions.143 
Shifting from the pound to the euro will also aid in 
acquisitions and mergers by making the process easier and 
more cost effective.  This is not only because the value of 
the assets of British firms would be in the same currency 
as those they would acquire.  Adopting the euro also 
removes losses from exchange rate fluctuation.  A bid for 
takeover of another firm could take months to materialize 
from offer to acceptance.  This does not include time for 
counter offers from other firms, such as large United 
States corporations.  In that time the value of sterling 
versus the euro could fluctuate significantly. To deal with 
this contingency, firms must consider purchasing currency 
futures.  Futures help to remove some losses by purchasing 
currency in advance at a fixed price.  However, currency 
conversion and futures purchases have fees associated with 
called transaction costs.  These fees come from the 
requirement to pay traders and firms to buy and sell 
currency.144 
The British government and Bank of England endeavor to 
‘shadow’ the euro closely to maintain exchange stability 
and maintain the option to enter the EMU in the near 
future.  Despite this, there has been no requirement for 
them to do so since they withdrew from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, and so the problems 
                     143 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Eighth Report on Euro Preparations, 
Appendix 2 “Memorandum by the Society of British Aerospace Companies 
Ltd”, 15 May 2000. 
144 Artis, 349.  Removal of transaction costs is a major component of 
the argument in favor of the euro.  A 1990 analysis conducted by the 
European Commission estimated that 0.2 percent of the total GDP of the 
EEC would be saved by removing transaction costs.  With the GDP of the 
EU in 2002 at 8.5 billion euro, 0.2 percent amounts to a hypothetical 
savings of 17 million euro in 2002. 
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of transaction costs and exchange rate fluctuation persist.  
For example, between June 2003 and June 2004 the euro to 
pound exchange rate has varied by nearly eight percent in 
value.  In attempting to make an offer on a corporation 
whose stock is valued in euros, this type of fluctuation 
could alter the real value of the purchase or cause the 
purchaser to hedge the offer on currency fluctuation. 
These overhead costs of doing business in Europe are 
among the reasons that firms like BAE aggressively lobby 
the British government to enter the EMU.145  In a memorandum 
presented as evidence to Her Majesty’s Treasury Select 
Committee on euro preparations, the Society of British 
Aerospace Companies came out in favor of the euro stating: 
The introduction of the euro as a global 
aerospace pricing factor would undoubtedly aid 
European aerospace.  It would reduce the use of 
costly hedging instruments.  The damaging effect 
of long-term fluctuations on business plans and 
programme costings would be much reduced.  A 
broader, more liquid European euro financial 
market could help reduce the cost of borrowing 
over the long term, matching Boeings ability to 
find 50-year bonds at reasonable cost.  It should 




A strong and stable euro would constitute a 
powerful tool for the European aerospace industry 
as well as acting as a catalyst for wider changes 
in the structure and operation of the 
defence/aerospace sector.  Even to nibble away at 
some of the dollar’s power to dictate the terms 
of world aerospace trade would bring considerable 
benefit to the European aerospace and defence 
industries.147 
                     145 HM Treasury, Eighth Report on Euro Preparations, Appendix 2.  
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These statements clearly lay out the benefits the euro 
offers to the British defence and aerospace sectors and are 
as valid in 2004 as they were in 2000.  
D. THE EURO AND DEFENCE MARKET COOPERATION 
Membership in the euro could be a helpful step in 
European defence contractor consolidation.  Another 
positive step in rationalization would be to improve the 
efficiency of collaborative procurement projects in Europe.  
Economist Keith Hartley, of the University of York, has 
stated that a fully rationalized European defence market 
could save European governments a total of €6 billion per 
year.148  Achieving these savings through efficient 
collaborative projects within Europe is clearly a priority 
for the British government.  The United Kingdom has a long 
history of supporting multinational weapon systems 
procurement through bodies like NATO and the Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG).  This trend has continued 
recently with the French British agreement at le Touquet in 
February 2003 which called for a new European defence 
capabilities agency.   After receiving support from all 
member nations at the EU Summit at Thessalonica, the agency 
was funded, staffed and named the European Defence Agency 
(EDA). 
The EDA will work to establish common defence 
requirements, supervise research and development and foster   
pan-European defence projects.  Headed by Javiar Solana, 
the new EU agency is well positioned to work with the 
already existing European Joint Armaments Cooperation 
Organization, known by its French acronym OCCAR, 
                     148 Cited in Daniel Keohane, Europe’s New Defence Agency, Center for 
European Reform Policy Brief (June 2004). 
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headquartered in Bonn.  OCCAR is a non-European Union 
organization composed of British, French, German, Belgian, 
Dutch, Italian, Spanish and potentially Swedish 
representatives working to coordinate military requirements 
and manage joint arms projects.149  The most significant 
OCCAR project to date is the European air lifter, the 
A400M, being built by Airbus for Britain, Germany, France, 
Belgium, Spain and Turkey.  The British MoD, which intends 
to purchase twenty-five A400M, has delegated management of 
the program to OCCAR.150 
Organizations like the EDA and OCCAR provide 
mechanisms for creating very lucrative pan-European defence 
contracts.  Additionally, it provides a means to acquire 
common defence systems which are of the highest quality and 
are comprised of the most advanced systems.  Pan-European 
systems take advantage of two economies of scale which 
diversify risk and spread the high research and development 
costs over a larger number of buyers.  A small nation may 
require only fifty new combat aircraft and is not capable 
of researching, developing and producing a system of the 
most advanced and capable quality.  A great deal of 
experimentation is required to produce those systems and is 
highly expensive.151  European nations, as well as many 
nations globally, are then left in a quandary: whether to 
have second or third class systems or buy from an American 
firm. 
British membership of the eurozone would aid access to 
OCCAR contracts and collaboration because of the same 
                     149 US Defense Acquisition website, 
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exchange rate efficiencies that would aid in European 
defence firm mergers.  Contracts for weapons must be 
drafted and estimated well in advance and the use of a 
common currency would make the bids free from currency 
instability.  This is especially true when considering the 
long time horizon, typically thirty years, when considering 
a major defence programme.152  These price stabilities would 
be beneficial to both the British MoD and British defence 
firms.  The MoD could project future expenditure better if 
it could remove exchange rate instability from project 
costs.  Defence firms would benefit by being able to 
provide the most competitive bids possible without exchange 
fluctuation or transaction costs. 
An increased number of collaborative acquisition 
projects would be particularly favorable to the British 
defence industrial base.  This is true because as the 
largest and most capable defence sector in Europe it stands 
positioned to play a lead role in collaborative projects.  
BAE Systems, as an example, it is particularly well suited 
to be the leader in a stronger and leaner European defence 
market.  BAE has defence systems as its primary focus.  It 
develops and produces electronic and avionic systems and in 
recent years has transformed itself into a leader in 
systems integration.  Systems integration is a defence 
field of increasing importance.  Systems integration is 
critical to interoperability across services and 
nationalities.  Systems integration is also important for 
managing major projects conducted across national lines 
because of the physical distribution of design and build 
teams.153  By contrast, the next largest defence contractor 
                     152 Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, 28-40. 
153 Vlachos-Dengler, 13.  As an example of its leadership and skill 
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in Europe, EADS, does not draw as much revenue from the 
defence sector as it is the prime owner of Airbus and does 
not have a specialization in systems integration.154  
Participation in more pan-European collaborative 
acquisition projects would also have a cascading effect on 
improved spending of MoD budget resources.  Systems which 
are procured commonly in Europe, especially the most 
complex and expensive, can be pooled in common support and 
supply bases, a topic which will be addressed next. 
E. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE EURO ZONE 
British membership in the EMU offers numerous 
advantages of which the United Kingdom’s MoD could take 
advantage to provide more capable and cost effective 
military forces.  As has already been explained, British 
conversion to the euro would help to further rationalize 
the European defence industries and strengthen an already 
strong defence sector in the United Kingdom.  This would 
provide the MoD with more efficient spending due to 
improved competition.  Large collaborative projects would 
provide the MoD with lower project costs because research 
and development costs could be spread over quantitatively 
larger equipment purchases.155 
Defence economists state that increased defence 
industry rationalization does not necessarily produce a 
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more cost effective product for taxpayers.  This is based 
on the argument that defence is a ‘public good’ and not 
exposed to true market forces as is a regular consumer 
product.  Therefore it is impossible to measure what is 
efficient and most cost effective.156  This view is 
certainly persuasive and it is as applicable to a small 
market as a large one.  Therefore, the small and shrinking 
internal market that British defence contractors now have 
is just as inefficient and unable to be measured as a 
larger one.  It is certain that a larger market will be 
able to distribute research and development costs over a 
larger production run which the smaller market cannot.157  
In the case of the United Kingdom, much of the research and 
development funding is covered by the government in advance 
as opposed to it being figured into the final unit price as 
is done in the United States. 
Rationalization of defense industries in the United 
Kingdom and Europe as a whole are one way to provide the 
MoD better and more cost effective defense capabilities.  
There are two additional ways which the MoD spends money 
where the use of the euro would mark an improvement over 
the pound.  A switch to the euro would make MoD spending 
more efficient by removing the problems of exchange rate 
variability and transaction cost from procurement and 
maintenance of equipment.  These benefits are distinct from 
and additional to the positive effects the euro could have 
for cooperation in and consolidation of the European 
defense industrial base.  Furthermore, MoD money spent 
                     156 Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, 30. 
157 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation: Asset or Threat to 
NATO? (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press) 2001, 11. 
63 
within the euro area to provision garrisoned troops would 
no longer be a drain upon the British economy. 
When making purchases of European manufactured 
equipment, the use of the euro would remove any currency 
exchange rate losses due to fluctuation.  Currently MoD 
contracts for equipment purchases may be drafted in either 
euros or pounds.  The MoD reserves the right to price 
pounds as the purchasing currency in order to minimize 
exposure to foreign exchange risk.158  This system, which 
does give the MoD some more leverage to keep from losing 
out in currency exchange fluctuation, is still 
disadvantageous for two reasons.  First, it represents a 
drag on the MoD bureaucracy to have to constantly 
participate in the currency speculation market.  A staff of 
personnel would have to deal with the prospects of currency 
variation when considering a contract for weapons or 
equipment purchased from the eurozone.  Over the course of 
a long procurement of complex systems which can take years 
from contract to delivery, the price due to exchange 
instability could fluctuate significantly.  Secondly, by 
deferring contracts to pounds with the option to pay in 
euros, suppliers are forced to hedge against loss.  
Therefore, they will likely quote a higher price to prevent 
loss due to exchange rate fluctuation.  This prevents the 
MoD from getting the most advantageous price from a 
eurozone supplier.  The gains offered in this area are 
currently modest due to the fact that by law only ten 
percent of all MoD contracts go to firms outside the United 
                     158 Ministry of Defence, Guidelines for Industry: 14 Single European 
Currency – Preparation for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – 
Introduction of the Euro. 
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Kingdom.159  Still the removal of this complexity has 
benefits in other procurement arenas which are more 
speculative. 
British euro membership could improve competition in 
the defense marketplace throughout Europe and aid in its 
further rationalization.  One of the areas which euro 
membership offers benefits is in aiding improved 
cooperation in defence procurement.  As has already been 
shown the increased cost and complexity of modern defense 
systems makes the need for the distribution of research and 
development over a large number of buyers essential.  
Common procurement through collaborative projects such as 
Eurofighter, A400M, METEOR air-to-air missile and perhaps 
even CVF has the additional benefit of creating near 
identical equipment across national boundaries.  The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long struggled to 
foster equipment standardization to aid in collective 
defense efforts.160  Common procurement has another benefit 
for complex systems by enabling them to be pooled for 
maintenance and support.  Sir Timothy Garden, a retired 
British Air Marshall, has championed the objective of 
pooling shared defense assets to generate economies of 
scale in maintenance and training. 
Pooling of assets does not require shared access to 
equipment collectively owned by multiple nations, as in the 
NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).  Instead 
it simply would provide for a consolidation of bases which 
support the most complex, usually aerospace, platforms. As 
an example, numerous European militaries currently use the 
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C-130 Hercules, F-16 Falcon and Tornado aircraft.  Each 
nation maintains separate bases for the complex maintenance 
and repair of these aircraft.  Presently, each nation 
requires a separate contract with the builder for parts and 
technical support as well as for the training of personnel 
in each nation’s respective armed forces.  As the 
Eurofighter Typhoon and A400M come into use, it is obvious 
that this pooling of defense assets offers improved 
efficiencies while maintaining control over sovereign 
military assets.161   
The pooling of shared defence resources is fraught 
with domestic concerns.  Clearly, domestic politics will 
play a role since domestic economic interests will not wish 
to see their local military bases closed, for obvious 
reasons.  With the large numbers of common assets and 
numerous nations involved, it stands to reason that 
consolidation of European airbases could occur to reflect 
pooled assets.  This would likely mean the closing and 
consolidation of bases in the United Kingdom.  However, 
austerity measures such as base closures are a reality.  
This is evidenced by the 2004 announcement of force 
downsizing in Great Britain.  Force size will be reduced by 
twenty-thousand personnel, one dozen ships, three aircraft 
squadrons and at least one Royal Air Force base.162  
Therefore, with difficult defence decisions being made, the 
United Kingdom must consider pooling resources for savings. 
A pan-European asset pooling effort would bring 
significant savings to the MoD and could be significantly 
improved by the adoption of the euro in the United Kingdom.                       161  Alexander and Garden, 564-569. 
162  International Security News Watch, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&paren
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Pooling of defense assets would create two beneficial 
effects that the adoption of the euro use would facilitate.  
First, common contracts would have to be drafted to pay for 
support and training.  This would require the mingling of 
some defense monies into a common pot.  By removing 
exchange rate instability from the equation, MoD 
expenditure could be stabilized and projected with clarity.  
Secondly, any reorganization of airbases in Europe would 
likely result in a negotiated settlement which would place 
more British personnel in eurozone countries.  Membership 
in the euro could have a positive effect on the cost to the 
British economy of maintaining troops in continental 
Europe.  The prospect of not harming the British economy by 
having troops stationed outside of the United Kingdom 
extends beyond the hypothetical of pooled resources to 
other troops already based in the eurozone. 
Currently, the United Kingdom maintains over twenty-
thousand troops in Germany.  These soldiers, mostly of the 
UK 1st Armoured Division, compose the bulk of British 
mechanized and armoured land forces.  These troops are 
forward positioned partly as a legacy of the Cold War when 
they were part of the British Army of the Rhine but also to 
provide the land mobile forces to the defence of Europe and 
the Atlantic Alliance. 163  Paying for the garrisoning of 
troops in Germany has been a problem historically as 
mentioned in Chapter II.  Between the 1950’s and 1970’s the 
British government struggled to pay for the support of its 
troops in Europe.  This was not because the MoD of 
government could not pay for such a large military; rather 
it was because the stationing of troops represented a 
direct loss from the British economy.  Troops stationed in                      163 http://www.army.mod.uk/aroundtheworld/ger/index.htm July 2004. 
67 
Germany were paid in pounds which they then converted to 
deutschmarks to provision food, housing and whatever else 
soldiers purchased.  Economically, it was like hundreds of 
thousands of British tourists on paid holiday to Germany.  
The provisioning of supplies, food, fuel and sundries by 
the British MoD also took money away from the British 
Treasury and put it into the German economy.  It became 
such a drain on the United Kingdom that Germany had to pay 
money to keep British troops occupying and protecting their 
country.164 
All of this occurred during the Bretton Woods monetary 
system when the movement of currency actually meant the 
movement of real wealth, in the form of gold or US dollars, 
from nation to nation.  With the collapse of Bretton Woods 
in 1973, the stationing of troops became less of a problem 
for the United Kingdom’s Treasury, but troops and their 
families stationed in the eurozone still take money 
directly out of the treasury and put it into ‘foreign’ 
economies as opposed to their own.  This is also the case 
where United Kingdom forces are deployed to areas where the 
euro is the de facto currency.  This is the case in Bosnia 
where three-thousand British soldiers are currently 
stationed.  Membership in the euro would make the payment, 
provisioning and support of these soldiers contribute to 
the British economy in a way that they do not now.  As a 
member in the EMU, British troops garrisoned in Europe 
would spend their money in the closed system of the EMU.  
This would contribute to the overall health of the 
eurozone.  While this is still not as favorable as if the 
money went back into Britain, it is at least a neutral 
effect.  Under the current regime with Britain outside the                      164 Zimmerman, 11-31.  
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euro, money spent in the eurozone is a direct drain on the 
pound and contribute to the British balance of payments 
deficit. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The benefits of the euro over the pound are numerous 
when considering the potential effects upon the ability of 
Britain to field credible defence forces.  The positive 
points include immediate savings when procuring equipment 
from the eurozone countries and housing, paying and 
provisioning troops garrisoned there.  The effects euro 
membership would have upon the British defence industry are 
more long-term in nature.  In all, they present benefits to 
the domestic defence industry and potential savings to the 
Ministry of Defence in procuring equipment from a more 
rationalized and competitive European defence market.  The 
cost savings offered by pooling resources are a more long 
term but also beneficial savings in the face of much 
constrained defence budgets. 
Two additional factors make euro membership and a more 
consolidated European defence industry attractive to the 
United Kingdom.  The first is the movement in the United 
States towards a ‘Buy America’ posture in defence 
procurement.  The second is the successful eastward 
expansion of the EU.  The first factor highlights the need 
for British defence contractors to diversify their markets 
in the face of possible increased American protectionism.  
The second further illustrates the lucrative nature of the 
future European market.  Although ten new accession states 
in the east165 are not in the EMU, in all likelihood they 
                     165  The ten states which joined the EU in 2004 are Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Greek Cyprus and Malta. 
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will join in the near future.  Most of these nations need 
to modernize the militaries they inherited from prior 
membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.  Given the 
recent accession of eight of them166 to NATO as well, it 
will be of even greater importance for their militaries to 
integrate with the western alliance states.  The same is 
true for new NATO states such as Romania and Bulgaria which 
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IV. THE NATIONALISM OF DEFENCE AND CURRENCY SINCE 
1973 
As much as comparing British monetary and defence 
policies before 1973 illustrates rational ends-means 
integration, the juxtaposition of British priorities in 
monetary and defence policies since 1973 illustrates a 
paradox.  The formal end of the Bretton Woods system 
severed the two issues of monetary policy and defence 
policy in a way they had not been for over one hundred 
years.  With the advent of the free floating currency 
system, the British were unable to use military power and 
policy to protect the international strength of sterling.  
The power of sterling would be based upon its value as 
judged by the international currency marketplace.  Either 
investors had confidence in the value of British money and 
economy, or they did not. 
In 1980, John van Wingen and Herbert Tillema observed 
that British military interventions after World War Two 
ceased in 1970.  These two authors subtly link this reality 
to entrance into the EEC, therefore intimating a shift in 
strategic priorities.167  Indeed, EEC membership did 
indicate a shift in British focus, but the implication that 
somehow EEC membership ‘tamed’ Britain is false.  EEC 
membership, which Britain had sought since 1962, was the 
product of a British move towards the EEC focus on 
manufacturing strength as opposed to international currency 
strength.168  As was shown in Chapter II, the latter had 
been the touchstone of British foreign and defence policy 
for over one hundred years.  Monetary strength was still an                      167 Van Wingen and Tillema, 293. 
168 Middleton, 126-131 and Cain and Hopkins, 291-292. 
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important objective in 1966, although the British pursued 
this objective by different means after 1956.169  The 
collapse of Bretton Woods, which had begun in 1971, 
confirmed the wisdom of Britain’s rejection of the pursuit 
of strong money. 
The paradox is that Britain has, at several points 
since 1973, acted much as it had before the end of Bretton 
Woods.  When they wrote their article in 1980, van Wingen 
and Tillema were correct that Britain had not intervened 
militarily since 1970 but that pattern did not hold.  In 
1982, Britain retook the Falkland Islands by force from the 
Argentines.  In 1991, Britain was the second largest non-
Middle Eastern troop contributor to force Iraq to withdraw 
from Kuwait.170  In 2003, Britain again made the second 
largest troop contribution to the American led military 
intervention in Iraq.  Regarding currency, Britain has 
remained aloof from stage three of the European Unions 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the implementation of a 
common European currency.  Particularly from 1979 to 1990, 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was utterly belligerent 
towards the single currency.171  This opposition did 
continue somewhat under Prime Minister John Major, from 
1990 to 1997.172  From 1997 to present, Prime Minister Tony 
                     169 See Chapter II. 
170 Only two nations contributed more troops, the United States 
(540,000) which lead the operation and Saudi Arabia (118,000) from 
whose soil the invasion was launched.  For its part Britain contributed 
43,000 troops. http://www.desert-storm.com/War/nations.html September 
2004.  
171 Prime Minister Thatcher’s vehement objections to the single 
currency are renowned for their intensity and occasional lack of 
decorum.  This is seen clearly in Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: 
Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Woodstock, New York: The 
Overlook Press, 1998), 306-375 and in Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: 
The Revival of British Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1997), 141-
183. 
172 Young, 412-472. 
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Blair, despite overtly supporting British membership in the 
euro, has not succeeded in bringing Britain into the EMU. 
This chapter does not intend to suggest that a present 
day relationship exists between British defence policy and 
monetary policy.  Quite the opposite is the case.  
Additionally, the British have not displayed a penchant to 
continue to act as if a connection remains.  The British 
are aware that the relationship between defence and money 
in their country has only a fiscal dynamic.  This fact 
illustrates the paradox even more clearly.  As has already 
been shown in Chapter III, the euro offers some advantages 
to contemporary British defence.  What this chapter seeks 
to illustrate is that since its final curtain call on the 
world stage, 1970 to 1973, the United Kingdom has sought at 
times to reassert itself as an independent power in global 
affairs.  In doing so, British political elite have been 
partly motivated by, and have tapped into, British military 
and economic nationalism.  The reasons for these 
reassertions are manifold and this chapter does not intend 
to consider all the reasons for action.  Indeed, the era 
from 1973 to 2002 has seen significant contextual changes 
in both security and economic realms. 
In the Cold War, the détente of the early 1970’s gave 
way to the tensions of the 1980’s and its eventual end in 
1991.  The peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
other security concerns to the fore, such as rogue and 
failed states and terrorism.173  NATO too has changed, from 
the bulwark against Communist aggression in Europe to a 
force capable of intervening and stabilizing regions 
outside the territories of its members.174  In the same way, 
                     173 Keylor, 317-340, 382-397 and 451-467. 
174 NATO has provided forces and command organization for the 
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changing economic conditions are important to the context 
of British actions.  The 1970’s oil shocks had significant 
effect on the global economy and despite its internal oil 
resources; Britain was a victim of the stagflation of the 
1970’s.175  Domestic economic policy reform had significant 
effect on British attitudes towards the EMU in the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s.  Tony Blair’s Labour party has shifted 
attitudes on British membership.176  However, economic 
realities such as interest rate convergence, an inflexible 
labor market and mortgage rates remain. 
All of these reasons are rational components of 
contemporary British attitudes towards defence and monetary 
policies.  These rational motivations have been important 
to shaping the behavior of Britain in the post-Bretton 
Woods world.  This chapter will illustrate that the 
incentives remain for British politicians to fall back onto 
nationalist behavior and the population willingly 
follows.177  Additionally it will examine when this behavior 
occurs and the particular form that contemporary British 
nationalism takes.  British nationalism since 1973 has 
revolved around the issues of defence and currency.  This 
nationalism varies in intensity between overt declarations 
of sovereignty and policy decisions to subtle percolation 
through the back-benches of Parliament.  Contemporary 
British nationalism is not the property of one party or the 
other although the Tory Party is responsible for its most 
                     
stabilization of failed states ‘out of area’ such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
175 Keylor, 346-347. 
176 Richard Heffernan, “Beyond Euro-scepticism: Exploring the 
Europeanisation of the Labour Party since 1983,” in The Political 
Quarterly Vol. 72, Iss. 2, (April 2001), 180-189. 
177 Young, 506 and Milward, 433 and 435. 
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overt resurgence.  It can be found in the Labour party as 
well, and importantly, cutting through the entire polity.  
When playing nationalistic politics in Britain, defence and 
currency are the two issues which are most easily exploited 
to achieve a desired political effect.  Defence and 
monetary policy therefore continue to remain linked in the 
British political psyche as critical issues of sovereignty 
and national identity. 
A. BRITISH DEFENCE NATIONALISM SINCE 1973 
One of the most striking factors concerning British 
foreign and defence policies in the 1970’s is that they had 
strikingly little global importance.  Richard Crossman, 
while serving as Foreign Minister under Edward Heath, 
commented that British foreign policy in the period was, 
“all fish and Rhodesia” referring to disputes with Iceland 
over fishing and Ian Smith’s rebellion in the former colony 
of Rhodesia.178  Certainly, British foreign and defence 
policy was not so irrelevant, but the sense of 
powerlessness and insignificance is well illustrated.  
Accession to the EEC and the advent of floating currencies 
resulted in the loss of monetary policy as the root 
objective of foreign and defence policy.  Britain had a 
difficult time adjusting to the new realities of being a 
middle-power, in the EEC and located on a small island off 
the coast of Europe.  The 1974 return of Edward Heath as 
Prime Minister led to no significant changes from previous 
policies despite aggressive claims while he was in 
opposition.  British defence and foreign policy was adrift 
without the lodestar of sterling to guide its interests.179 
                     178 Quoted in Sharp, 14-15. 
179 Sharp, 14-21. 
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Observers tell us that British foreign and defence 
policy was reborn under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Thatcher from 1979 to 1990.180  Thatcher is not as well 
known for her foreign policy as she is for her assertive 
domestic policies.  She sought to make Britain competitive 
internationally by renewing industry and shrinking the 
social welfare state that had developed in Britain, based 
upon the post World War Two politics of consensus.181  Paul 
Sharp, in his book Thatcher’s Diplomacy, asserts that 
Thatcher’s contribution to foreign policy was to give 
Britain a role it had lacked since 1970, the reassertion of 
an independent foreign  policy.182  Thatcher’s defence 
policies did indeed represent a return to independence, but 
a desire to play a role and influence international events 
simply for the sake of doing so in the absence of hard 
interests is a difficult objective.  The use of nationalism 
to galvanize the population and assure her standing in the 
eyes of the voters despite her devastating domestic 
economic policies provided added definition to Thatcher’s 
motivation.  This was captured in the attribution of her 
political recovery after 1981 to the ‘Falklands Factor.’183 
                     180 Paul Sharp in, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British 
Foreign Policy, strongly supports Thatcher’s foreign policies.  He 
feels it was a reassertion that Britain needed to find a role as a 
middle power, capable of playing a role.  His primary highlight 
throughout his book is on the concept of ‘independence’ and that 
Thatcher’s primary success was achieving ‘independence’ for Britain in 
the port Imperial world.  
181 For a detailed study of Thatcher’s domestic politics see Peter 
Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).  In fact in another book 
by Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1983), published four years into her government, that purports to cover 
all components of her policies, only one of ten chapters (the last) and 
23 of nearly 250 pages deals with foreign policy or defence.  
182 Sharp, xxvi. 
183 Thatcher herself has highlighted the ‘Falklands Factor’ as being 
a significant contribution to her domestic popularity and political 
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When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in April 
1982 it seemed possible, especially to Argentina, that 
Britain would accept the situation as a fait accompli.184  
Most colonial powers had shown little desire to fight the 
retaking of colonial outposts.185 Britain in particular had 
signaled a general lack of interest in the Falklands during 
the 1981 ‘leaseback’ negotiations with Argentina and 
announced reduction in the Royal Navy’s forces and presence 
in the area.186  However, Britain rejected the takeover and 
instead chose to go to war over a few small islands, 8,000 
miles away, occupied by 1,800 people and of no economic or 
strategic value.  This was a remarkable act of national 
will to risk lives and treasure for such a small, 
insignificant objective.  This was emphasized by the fact 
that the Thatcher government was aggressively pursuing 
austerity measures which cut social welfare and defence 
spending and was lobbying the EEC for a rebate of funds 
contributed.187  To put the war in perspective, historian 
Donald Cameron Watt called the Falklands, “…one of the most 
                     
success against the Labour party in Margaret Thatcher, The Downing 
Street Years (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 264. 
184 Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: 
The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), 78-79 and Michael Clarke, “Foreign Policy Analysis: A 
Theoretical Guide” in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western 
European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict ed. Stelios Stavridis and 
Christopher Hill (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 35.    
185 In the 1960’s Portugal had acquiesced to the Indian seizure of 
Goa, Diu and Daman and the under pressure from a militant insurgent 
movement, the Netherlands had allowed the UN to supervise the transfer 
of West Irian to Indonesia. 
186 Sharp, 57-59. 
187 Thatcher’s austerity policies can be found in Jenkins, Young and 
Sharp.  An astonishing insight into Thatcher’s willingness to risk her 
rigorous fiscal objectives could be seen on 10 April 1982, before 
combat operations had begun.  Thatcher said that the operation to 
retake the islands had to go ahead, ‘…because the reputation of Britain 
is at stake’ and consequently, ‘…we cannot look at it on the basis of 
precisely how much it will cost’. Quoted in Sharp, 67.     
78 
incongruous and unnecessary international disputes which 
has ever broken out between states.”188 
Thatcher’s motivation for a military response to 
Argentina’s aggression was in part due to the issue of 
domestic political stability.  Thatcher’s domestic policies 
were wreaking havoc in the British population and cuts in 
social welfare and high unemployment made her government 
particularly unpopular.  In 1983, her party was to face a 
by-election which would act as a de facto referendum on her 
policies. The national embarrassment of losing the 
Falklands would have doomed her to defeat.189  Instead she 
chose a belligerent path and, in doing so, couched her 
policy in the most rousing nationalistic terms.  She did so 
knowing that she had broad support in the population for a 
military adventure.  Additionally, she was presented with 
feasible military plans from her service chiefs, 
particularly Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, who had 
his own inter-service rivalry objective for suggesting the 
naval task force which would eventually recover the 
Falklands.190  The dispatch of Task Force 317 was greeted by 
broad support in the public and in the Parliament.191  Even 
Michael Foot, leader of the opposition Labour Party and a 
long-time pacifist, had called for, “deeds not words” on 
the Falklands.192 
Thatcher’s efforts to recover the Falklands had the 
desired effect.  “Great Britain is great again,” was the 
claim Thatcher made to a crowd outside Number 10 Downing                      188 Quoted in Sharp, 65. 
189 Sharp, 65-66. 
190 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 254-255. 
191 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 128-129. 
192 Quoted in Sharp, 84. 
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St. on 15 June.193  The Conservative party made all it could 
politically of the success in the Falklands and Thatcher 
made a dramatic recovery in public opinion polls.  This 
success was despite the fact that domestic economic 
conditions had not improved and there were threats of a 
coal miner’s strike.  Miners had torn Britain apart 
politically before, and Thatcher’s policies towards them 
would become a hallmark of her domestic political agenda.  
Despite the domestic problems, the ‘Falklands Factor’ 
helped to save her political career.194  Thatcher had found 
an effective political use for the British military, 
channeling its efforts into nationalism.  Thatcher had 
other reasons as well for recovering the Falklands by 
force, but there is no doubt that her political survival 
was of real concern. Rallying the nation with a war was 
clearly an option she was willing to take.195 
Thatcher strengthened this approach with her 
consistently nationalistic rhetoric, such as her speech at 
Cheltenham on 3 July 1982 in which she said, 
We have ceased to be a nation in retreat.  
We have instead a new found confidence – born in 
the economic battles at home and tested and found 
true 8000 miles away…And so we can rejoice at our 
success in the Falklands and take pride in the 
achievements of the men and women of our Task 
Force.  But we do so, not as at some flickering 
of a flame which must soon be dead.  No – we 
rejoice that Britain has rekindled that spirit 
which has fired her for generations past and 
                     193 Quoted in The Times (London), 15 June 1982. 
194 Harold D. Clarke, William Mishler and Paul Whiteley, “Recapturing 
the Falklands: Models of Conservative Popularity,” in British Journal 
of Political Science Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), 63-81 and Helmut 
Norpoth, “Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain,” in The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), 949-
959. 
195 George, 163. 
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which today has begun to burn as brightly as 
before.  Britain found herself again in the South 
Atlantic and will not look back from the victory 
she has won.196 
 
This vehement nationalism was supported by the public 
and much of the press, particularly the popular British 
tabloids.  The nationalism of the Falklands War involved 
the resurrection of a vision of a Victorian era Britain, of 
strength, pride and sovereignty.  The Falklands would be 
identified as critical turning point for the history of 
Britain as Thatcher argued above.197 
Thatcher’s successes spawned a new generation of 
nationalist politicians in Britain, they called themselves 
‘Thatcher’s Children’ and their effect can still be seen 
today.  This new breed of Tories would make their political 
careers on the coat-tails of her electoral victories and 
later upon a reassertion of nationalistic neo-Thatcherite 
policies.  Strong defence was an important component to 
their nationalist policies.  However, their nationalism 
would make its mark more in their assertion of Britain’s 
independence from the euro.  This was a direct legacy of 
Thatcher’s economic nationalism and it would eventually rip 
the Tory Party apart and drive it from power. 
B. BRITISH ECONOMIC NATIONALISM SINCE 1973 
Paul Sharp highlights Thatcher’s stance on the EEC as 
another example of her policy of independence.  In many                      196 Thatcher, 235. 
197 A thorough study of British nationalist sentiment in the 
Falklands War has been done by Kevin Foster in Fighting Fictions: War 
Narrative and National Identity (London: Pluto Press, 1999).  As 
opposed to some writers who have stated that the British military myth 
of the Falklands has been constructed anew (and in contrast to the 
realities of the conflict), Foster asserts that the national myth of 
the Falklands was written before the war was even fought, the images 
and stories were erected from the British military’s past with the 
intention of evoking a return to greatness for Britain as opposed to 
the creation of a new role.  
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ways, Thatcher’s approach to the EEC was fraught with 
contradictions; she opposed most EEC policies and stoked 
nationalist fires against them while at the same time she 
oversaw the deepening of British involvement in the 
Community.198  Thatcher had little use for or interest in 
European integration.  Many EEC policies ran against her 
domestic economic reform objectives.  She sought to cut the 
fetters which she felt restricted her ability to transform 
the British economy.199  One of her first objectives, 
fulfilling a campaign promise, was to obtain a rebate from 
the EEC of monies paid into the EEC budget, to which 
Britain was a net contributor. The majority of EU funds 
paid out went to agricultural subsidies for the more 
agrarian societies in the Community such as France, Ireland 
and southern Italy.200  Thatcher was eventually able to 
obtain a significant rebate which she touted a major 
victory for British sovereignty and fiscal strength.201  The 
issue that incited the most impassioned plea to nationalism 
was the subject of EMU and a single European currency. 
It has been observed that never has British policy 
been so driven by the particular personality of its Prime 
Minister as it was under Thatcher.  Her deep personal 
skepticism towards Europe and her little-England narrow-
mindedness had roots stretching back to her childhood and 
                     198 Young, 306—311.  This deepening included the Single European Act 
and the shifting of EEC voting procedures on some issues from unanimous 
to majority voting, a critical step away towards the un-democratic 
procedures in the EEC that were the source of many rows between 
Thatcher and the Community.   
199 Thatcher, 688-705. 
200 These EU disbursements went under the common title Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
201 Young, 311-325 and Sharp, 141-159. 
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early political experiences.202  Thatcher viewed the 
surrendering of monetary control, which is implicit in 
accepting the EMU, as a sacrifice of sovereignty.203  She 
aggressively moved to press this opinion upon the 
population of Britain.  The most famous of her rhetorical 
outbursts took place in Bruges in 1988 where she openly 
declared opposition to any centralization of power in 
Brussels.  Further integration, particularly EMU which was 
being debated at the time, should be with the focus on 
national independence which, “…preserves the different 
traditions, parliamentary powers, and a sense of national 
pride in one’s own country.”204 
Thatcher’s speech at Bruges was an initiation of a new 
line of nationalist policy towards European integration.  
She attempted at first to support her anti-integration 
instincts with assertions that surrendering control over 
monetary policy removed the ability of government to 
protect the value of currency.  This illustrates the 
contradiction of her approach to EMU.  The fact that the 
pound was subject to political influence was the single 
force which was the cause of its debasement.  As a 
politician who often derided her opponents for not “getting 
the economics right”205 before taking a decision, Thatcher’s 
economics were clearly wrong on EMU.  Even two of 
Thatcher’s most senior advisors, Nigel Lawson, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, 
                     202 Young, 307-309 
203 Thatcher, 690-691. 
204 Quoted in Sharp, 169. 
205 Sharp, 176. 
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felt that Britain should move diplomatically towards EMU 
for economic reasons.206 
Absent a solid economic argument for why to remain out 
of the EMU, and its perceived precursor the European 
Monetary System (EMS)207, Thatcher turned to the protection 
of British sovereignty as the touchstone of her policy 
towards EMU.  Her rhetoric became even more imbued with 
dramatic images of British sovereignty in her speeches to 
the populace.  In 1989, in a speech to Tories in Scotland, 
she said that Britain was not, “…some flimsy or recent 
creation…” and evoked images of Britain as a, “…great and 
ancient citadel…” which had protected its populace for four 
hundred years.208  She told parliament prior to a critical 
EEC summit in Madrid which would deal with the subject of 
EMU that, “…to run an independent monetary, economic and 
fiscal policy lies at the heart of what constitutes a 
sovereign state.”209  This nationalistic opposition to EMU 
left Thatcher increasingly isolated in the EEC and in her 
own cabinet.  Lawson and Howe would both leave their 
positions in Thatcher’s government in 1989 after the Madrid 
summit.  Howe was dismissed and Lawson resigned.210  This 
                     206 Sharp, 175-176. 
207 The EMS agreement had an embedded Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
which required member states to maintain the exchange rate parody 
between currencies in a narrow band.  ERM was seen as a necessary step 
in harmonizing economies in Europe in advance of the implementation of 
a single currency.  
208 Quoted in Sharp, 176. 
209 Quoted in The Times (London), 13 May 1989.  
210 Thatcher had grown increasingly inpatient with these two members 
of her cabinet which she regarded with suspicion because they seemed to 
have formed a ‘cabal’ against her position on ERM and EMU.  Thatcher 
and her personal advisors dismissed these two with great flippancy as 
can be seen from their own statements.  In her memoirs Thatcher states, 
“Something had happened to Geoffrey (Howe)” intimating that his 
dismissal was in part caused by the fact that he may have gone slightly 
off his rocker, Young, 356.  The issue that provoked Lawson seems to 
have been a comment by Thatcher’s special advisor, economist Alan 
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aggressively nationalistic anti-Europeanism would 
ultimately be the pretext for her removal from the 
leadership of the Conservative Party.   
The more moderate wing of the Tories felt her radical 
tendencies were too extreme and she was challenged in the 
1990 Conservative leadership campaign by Michael Heseltine.  
Heseltine was more in favor of European integration and was 
backed by Lawson who derided Thatcher’s European policy in 
his endorsement speech.211  She would resign in the face of 
Heseltine’s palpable challenge.  In a final effort to 
ensure the future direction of the party Thatcher 
successfully endorsed John Major, whom she felt was closer 
to her politically than Heseltine.212  Thatcher was deposed 
by a movement within her own party, but she had not lost 
the support of the populace.  Her successes in general 
elections are testament to her popularity in Britain.  Her 
public image as staunchly defending Britain was vital to 
this broad support, especially given the unpopularity of 
her domestic policies.213  Thatcher was gone, but the 
philosophy of Bruges had embedded itself in the electorate 
and the Conservative party.  It is an irony that new 
Conservative Members of Parliament (MP), often called 
‘Thatcher’s Children’, started to come to power just as 
Thatcher herself was undone.214 
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Thatcher’s indelible mark on the Conservative party 
was to empower its deeply Euro-skeptic wing.  Allied with 
older nationalist politicians in the Tory Party, such as 
William Cash and John Biffen, these younger MP’s had a 
decisive impact upon the actions and the eventual collapse 
of John Major’s government.  The deep divide in the Tory 
party, between those opposed to the single currency and 
those in favor of it, became a central issue for Major in 
1992.215  In an attempt to hold the party together Major 
obtained an exemption for Britain from automatic membership 
in the EMU.  This ‘opt-out’ clause in the 1992 Maastricht 
was aggressively campaigned for by the neo-Thatcherites.  
They consistently resorted to Thatcher’s extreme form of 
nationalism to appeal to the British population and 
challenge Major’s leadership.  One of the lasting legacies 
of these ‘bastards’, as Major referred to them, was the 
issue of national referendum on membership in EMU.216 
The nationalist half of the Conservative party 
succeeded in destroying party unity over the issue of EMU 
and dragging John Major down with it.  More importantly for 
                     215 Young, 388. 
216 In July 1993, John Major conducted a taped interview with ITN’s 
political editor Michael Brunson.  After the formal interview 
concluded, the tape continued to record, unbeknownst to Major.  Major 
bemoaned to Brunson the problem he faced in the euro-skeptic members of 
his government (Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and Michael Portillo), “Mr 
Major: ‘Just think it through from my perspective. You are the prime 
minister, with a majority of 18, a party that is still harking back to 
a golden age that never was, and is now invented (clearly a reference 
to the time of Mrs. Thatcher's leadership). You have three rightwing 
members of the Cabinet who actually resign. What happens in the 
parliamentary party?’”  Major explained that this problem is compounded 
by the fact that he cannot dismiss these Ministers.  This was because 
they would become a greater force for disunion outside of his cabinet.  
“We don't want another three more of the bastards out there.”  This 
story was broken by BBC and further fueled the euro-skeptic divide in 
Major’s government.  Quoted from Paul Routledge and Simon Hoggart 
“Major hits out at cabinet,” The Guardian, 25 July 1993, 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,9174,534415,00.html 
September 2004.         
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their objectives, they succeeded in embedding the concept 
of a national referendum on EMU in the expectations of the 
population.  Given Britain’s democratic traditions and the 
fact that initial membership in the EEC went to a 
referendum in 1975, it might seem that EMU would naturally 
require a national vote.  Actually, no European treaty 
since initial accession in 1975 had.  The issue of the 
referendum on EMU was a product of the Tory nationalist and 
Euro-skeptic wing.  This powerful party faction in Major’s 
government demanded, during the 1992 debate on the 
Maastricht Treaty, that a referendum be held if Britain 
were ever to enter the EMU.217  As Hugo Young puts it, 
An issue thus was born, Yes or No to a 
referendum, which was to invade Tory politics for 
the duration, the litmus-test of his honour, his 
nationalism, his respect for party – his whatever 
– that Major kept facing for the next five 
years.218 
 
Major would, with much resistance from his cabinet, 
acquiesce to these calls for a referendum.219  In order to 
maintain their populist credentials, Tony Blair and Labour 
Party, despite being overtly in favor of the euro, declared 
they too would hold a referendum on EMU.220 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has helped to illustrate that defence and 
currency are powerful symbols of national identity in 
British society.  It is not surprising that defence 
maintains such a place and the myth of war is a common tool 
in the hands of politicians who would use it.  The 
                     217 Young, 428-430. 
218 Young, 428-429. 
219 Young, 464-465. 
220 Young, 486-487. 
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Falklands War is an example of how symbols of British 
greatness and national identity were resurrected in the 
1980’s.  The domestic battle over membership in the single 
currency illustrates what a similar sense of nationalism 
revolves around the pound sterling.  Retaining an 
independent currency may lack solid economic objectives at 
times, as it did for Thatcher, but it never lacked the 












































A. THE PARADOXES OF BRITISH NATIONALISM 
The first paradox of British policies on defence and 
the EMU should be clear by now.  The EMU offers Britain 
real savings on an already shrinking defence budget.  
However, the Tory party, which paints itself as the party 
of nation, sovereignty, strong defence, NATO and solidarity 
with the United States,221 is unable to seize the issue of 
EMU.  The Tories have elevated defence and currency as two 
symbols of the nation, neither of which can be surrendered 
without undermining the other.  As has been shown, at one 
point in British history, the linkage of defence and 
currency was a reality.  The two maintained a symbiotic 
relationship for one hundred years.  Now they remain linked 
by the fact that they both reemerge in nationalist 
rhetoric. 
The Conservative party is presently trapped in 
opposition, only able to shout down Blair’s policies and 
keep the flame of nationalism alive.222  The hope of the 
extreme nationalists in the Tory Party hope is that, in a 
perverse resurrection of Guy Fawkes,223 they can use that 
                     221 Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, 4 November 2003. 
222 The speeches of Michael Portillo, the shadow Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for the Conservative Party are a good example of this.  His 
objections to Blair’s policies on the EMU are primarily nationalistic 
in tone.  He constantly highlights his assertion that EMU is the first 
step to subordinating national sovereignty to European political union 
in some sort of federal state.  Economic arguments take second place in 
his speeches against Blair.    
223 Guy Fawkes led a conspiracy to blow up the Houses of Parliament 
on 5 November 1605 when the King was to address the House of Lords.  
His motivation was to kill the Protestant King and restore a Catholic 
monarch to Britain.  Comparing the Conservative party to Guy Fawkes is 
with tongue firmly in cheek as Fawkes has been vilified in nationalist 
sentiment ever since and November 5th is celebrated in Britain as a type 
of independence day from popery and Continental conspiracy.   
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flame to ignite the referendum powder-keg that Blair has 
had to rest his EMU policy upon.  If the Tories can 
stimulate enough nationalist sentiment to kill EMU in a 
referendum they will have achieved their anti-Europe goals.  
The paradox is that at the same time they will have 
undermined an effort which could bring Britain more 
effective and capable armed forces.  If the Tories were 
able to seize upon EMU as a way to strengthen national 
defence they may be able to lead Britain into the EMU 
without surrendering any national military independence. 
The second paradox for Britain and the EMU faces the 
Labour Party and their leader Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
Blair openly supports British entry into the EMU when 
economic conditions are right.  However, Blair is held 
captive to the vacillation of public opinion which must be 
secured for the referendum to pass.224  On the issue of 
monetary sovereignty, that opinion can be easily 
manipulated by nationalist forces which can resurrect the 
ghost of Margaret Thatcher as needed.  Therefore, Blair 
treads gingerly around the subject of EMU and is careful to 
present a very clear and careful case on the subject.225  
Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
have established five very clear tests to judge whether the 
euro is good for Britain.  These tests exist not just to 
make a careful assessment of the EMU but to assure the 
public that EMU is the absolute best choice.  In 2003, the 
Blair government announced its first assessment on the five 
tests.  The report found that two of the five tests had 
been met.  However, it reported that the economy of Britain 
still lacks appropriate convergence with the eurozone, the 
                     224 Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, 4 November 2003. 
225 Young, 492-495. 
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labor market is not flexible enough and that EMU does not, 
because of the failure of the flexibility and convergence 
tests, offer assured stability in growth and employment.226 
The paradox arises for Blair in that his validity as a 
protector of British sovereignty competes with his 
credentials as ‘pro-Europe’ with other European leaders.227  
In order to bridge the gap between his stated objective of 
membership in the EMU and his ability to make it happen he 
has had to give ground where he can.  Defence emerged as a 
policy area where he could show that he was in fact 
dedicated to the European project.  The British have 
sternly rejected many efforts to build the defence pillar 
of Europe.  Anthony Eden had opposed the European Defence 
Community and his lack of support for it meant its 
undoing.228  The British have stayed aloof any European 
defence organization projects which exist outside the NATO 
                     226 Her Majesty’s Treasury, UK Membership of the Single Currency: An 
Assessment of the Five Economic Tests (CM 5776).  The five tests 
established by Her Majesties Treasury to assess the viability of euro 
membership are: 1. Are business cycles and economic structures 
compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro 
interest rates on a permanent basis?  2. If problems emerge is their 
sufficient flexibility to deal with them?  3. Would joining EMU create 
better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in 
Britain?  4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive 
position of the UK’s financial services industry, particularly the 
City’s wholesale markets?  5. In summary, will joining EMU promote 
higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?  The report is 
an interesting statement on the lack of importance of the pound as an 
international currency and the transformation of the City of London 
into an international finance service center.  The report found that 
the euro is actually better for the City that the pound.  This is 
profound in consideration of the fact that the City had always demanded 
a strong pound as necessary to its investment interests.      
227 Shortly after coming to power (October 1998) and despite his 
optimism on EMU, Blair was snubbed by France as not being in a position 
to be one of the ‘big three’ leaders in Europe because they had not 
decided to enter the EMU in time to participate in the initial 
implementation of the euro 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/187271.stm  September 2004 
228 Milward, 386-387 and George, 23-26. 
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construct.229  Tony Blair however, in order to show his 
‘Europeaness’ to his continental counterparts initiated a 
revival of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).230 
The joint Anglo-Franco declaration at Saint-Malo was a 
major shift of British policy.  Articles one and two of the 
declaration state, 
1. The European Union needs to be in a 
position to play its full role on the 
international stage. This means making a reality 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide 
the essential basis for action by the Union. It 
will be important to achieve full and rapid 
implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on 
CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the 
European Council to decide on the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy in the 
framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to 
take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, 
covering the whole range of activity set out in 
Title V of the Treaty of European Union.  
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity 
for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.231 
 
The declaration does go on to reaffirm the importance 
of NATO, but this was a notable shift from historical 
British policy.  Blair was partially motivated at Saint-
Malo by the Kosovo crisis and Europe’s inability to act                      229 The studies on this behavior are extensive and most attribute 
this British foreign and defence policy stance to the objective of 
keeping the Americans involved in European security matters.  NATO is 
the primary mechanism whereby this objective is accomplished; therefore 
no structures which marginalize NATO are accepted.  See H.C. Allen, The 
Anglo-American Predicament: The British Commonwealth, The United States 
and European Unity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1960), George, 30. 
230 http://www.eupolicynetwork.org.uk/research/dover2.pdf September 
2004 and interviews with Sir Timothy Garden, 4 November 2003 and 
Alexander Nicoll, 5 November 2004.  
231 Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence, 




alone to prevent crisis and genocide on its own soil.232  
This explanation lacks complete explanatory power because 
the Balkans had been rocked by genocide and European 
paralysis, save the galvanizing force of NATO, for seven 
years with little British movement on CFSP.  Notably, Blair 
had made no indication of a shift on CFSP prior to his 
election when Europe had failed to act in the Balkans. 
Blair has continued to reaffirm the Saint-Malo 
declaration with support for European rapid reaction forces 
at the le Touquet declaration in 2003.233  These steps 
toward greater European defence collaboration have been met 
with resistance both in the British populace and across the 
Atlantic in the United States.  Blair has been decried by 
his Euro-skeptical opponents as helping to create a 
‘European Army’ and undermining NATO.  Blair has had to 
meet all these challengers with fierce refutation that CFSP 
does any of these things.234  The critical difference is 
that CFSP is not subject to a public referendum.  CFSP has 
been a step that Blair has been able to take, as opposed to 
the euro, with only parliamentary support and not subject 
to the nationalistic sentiments of the populace.  
Therefore, the first paradox of British defence and the 
euro is that the party in favor of the euro is unable to 
join.  Therefore it has strengthened the military component 
                     232 This is the explanation offered by many pundits.  Blair has lent 
credence to it by publicly declaring that Kosovo Crisis was why he felt 
the need to bolster CFSP.  Michael Quinlan, European Defense 
Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Press, 2001), 29-30.  While asserting that Kosovo was the source of 
Blair’s shift, Quinlan acknowledges that Britain not participating in 
the euro was an influencing factor for Blair.    
233 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2726111.stm September 2004. 
234 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3231820.stm September 
2004. 
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of the EU, a policy shift which had previously been 
completely avoided. 
B. SUMMARY 
This thesis has illustrated the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between currency and defence in the United 
Kingdom.  The principle of strong British money has had 
specific consequences for defence policy.  From the late 
nineteenth century until the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, Britain has distinct national interest in 
maintaining the international strength of sterling.  Under 
varying international currency orders, British governments 
over this period used all the levers of national power to 
accomplish this goal.  This was achieved through direct 
military intervention or general defence policy to bolster 
the position of sterling.  After 1956, this was also 
accomplished by providing military support to United States 
policies.  The Americans would then in turn, buttress the 
pound.  The advent of floating international currencies in 
1973 broke the relationship between British military and 
monetary strength. 
Only a fiscal, not a monetary, relationship exists 
today between British currency and defence.  The British 
government can only spend more, or less, on defence based 
upon preference.  Defence policy, programmes and operations 
require fiscal commitments, and they do not provide Britain 
with monetary power.  Conversely, an internationally potent 
pound, because it does not generate the national wealth it 
once did, no longer funds a strong British military.  In 
much the same way that the EU offers benefits to British 
industry, the EMU offers Britain the potential to improve 
defense spending.  Membership of the euro will generate 
savings in transaction costs and minimize losses due to 
95 
exchange rate fluctuation.  These advantages will aid in: 
consolidating the European defence market; improving the 
health of British defence industries; making pan-European 
defence programmes more efficient; and making the spending 
of MoD money in the eurozone less of a drain on the British 
economy.  None of these benefits offer massive savings to 
British defence budgets.  However, the important point is 
that the euro is good for British defence, even if the 
benefits are small.  This is a profound change from the 
period before 1973 when the strength and independence of 
the pound was essential to British defence. 
Despite the removal of a connection between defence 
and currency and the present-day benefits of the euro to 
defence, Prime Minster Blair’s case for EMU membership does 
not highlight the benefits to defence.  This is true 
because British nationalism continues to be a potent force.  
Defence and currency persist as powerful imagined icons of 
former British greatness.  Military and monetary 
nationalism is deeply embedded in the minds of the polity 
and is understood by politicians.  The resurgence of 
military and monetary nationalism under Thatcher has shown 
how useful they can be to achieve political objectives.  
Monetary nationalism has called into doubt the success of a 
referendum on EMU.  Consequently, Prime Minister Blair has 
altered British policy regarding European Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy 
to display his ‘European’ credentials.  Meanwhile, the Tory 
opposition, because of their monetary nationalism, is 
unable to seize the issue of EMU as a means to improving 
British defence.  The politics of nationalism have tied a 
Gordian knot in contemporary Britain, and there is no 
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